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Introduction
Due to the growth of energy consumption, in particular of
fossil fuels such as oil and gas, the cross-border trade of fossil
fuels has increased.' International transportation of fossil fuels has
been carried out using a wide range of instruments, including both
offshore and onshore transmission. 2 The pipeline is a costI BP Energy Outlook 2030, BP STAT. REV. OF WORLD ENERGY (BP/Energy Rep.,
London), Jan. 2011, at 76-77, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energyeconomics/Energy-Outlook/BPEnergyOutlookBooklet_201 1.pdf [hereinafter 2011
Energy Outlook] (noting that the world primary energy consumption has grown by 45%
over the past 20 years and will likely grow another 39% over the next 20 years). During
the 20th century, the rate of produced and consumed natural gas daily increased. Id. at
31. While the use of oil and coal as main fuels has decreased around the world, natural
gas has increased. Id. at 35. The share of crude oil in the world's energy supply will
decline during the two next decades. See id. at 29.
2 See BP Energy Outlook 2030, BP STAT. REV. OF WORLD ENERGY (BP/Energy
Rep., London), Jan. 2012, at 18, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energyeconomics/Energy-Outlook/BP_EnergyOutlookBooklet-2012.pdf
[hereinafter 2012
Energy Outlook] (displaying map of major trade movemements in 2011 throughout the
world and a chart containing information about crude and product imports and exports in
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effective and relatively safe tool for the transportation of oil and
gas.' Pipelines are extensively used for terrestrial and submarine
transportation of hazardous materials.' In addition, there are many
offshore pipelines for transporting oil from offshore facilities to
coasts.5 An example is that found in the North Sea.' From a
technical perspective, cross-border oil and gas pipelines have
specific differences. From a legal perspective, however, crossborder oil and gas pipelines are very similar. These similarities and
differences will be explored throughout this paper.
Although pipelines are recognized as a safe way to transport
petroleum,' numerous pipeline accidents have occurred
worldwide.! Pipeline accidents have caused a significant number
of personal injuries, environmental damage, and economic loss
because of the types of substances transported by pipelines.' The
extent and amount of harm varies on a case-by-case basis
depending on the location of the pipeline.'o For example, on July
30, 2004, a transit gas pipeline exploded in the Ghislenghien
industrial zone approximately 50 kilometers south of Brussels,

2011).

3 Georgios A. Papadakis, Major Hazard Pipelines: A Comparative Study of
Onshore Transmission Accidents, 12 J. Loss PREVENTION PROCESS INDUSTRIES 91, 91
(1999); see 2012 Energy Outlook, supra note 2, at 34 (showing that 67.73% of the total
amount of global gas exports were transmitted via pipelines).
4 See Papadakis, supra note 3, at 92 (noting major onshore pipeline accidents
which mostly consist of the transmission of hazardous materials).
5 See id. at 96 (highlighting how offshore pipelines exist as a method for
transporting oil).
6 0YSTEIN NORENG, THE OIL INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT STRATEGY IN THE
NORTH SEA 31-34 (1980).
7 Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Pipelines are Safest for Transportation of Oil & Gas,
MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL'Y RES. 1, 1 (2013), available at http://www.manhattan-

institute.org/html/ib_23.htm#.U 3ffrywKHO;

W.

Kent

Muhlbauer,

Modeling for

Pipelines Risk Assessments, in PIPELINE RULES OF THUMB HANDBOOK: A MANUAL OF
QUICK, ACCURATE SOLUTIONS To EVERYDAY PIPELINE ENGINEERING PROBLEMS 733, 733

(E.W. McAllister ed., 8th 2013); see also Margaret T. Okoroduda-Fubara, Oil in the
Persian Gulf War: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J.
123, 125-26 (1991) (stating that governments have a responsibility to shape their
decisions with prudent care in ways that will protect the environment).
8 Muhlbauer, supra note 7, at 733.

9 See id. at 733-34; see Papadakis,supra note 3, at 92.
10 See Papadakis,supra note 3, at 92 (stating that pipeline failure can be avoided by
improving safety measures, but are still possible with aging infrastructure catastrophic
failures).
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Belgium."
That pipeline was transporting Norwegian gas to
France from the Belgian landfall of Zeepipe in Zeebrugge.12 As a
result of the accident, 24 people died and more than 120 were
injured." In another incident on July 25, 2010, a massive amount
of oil was released from a cross-border pipeline located in
Marshall, Michigan, causing 840,000 gallons of oil to spill into
Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. 4 As a result of this oil
spill, the air, waterways, and wetlands became contaminated,
resulting in a noxious and toxic stench and death and injury to
wildlife."
Generally, gas presents a higher risk of personal injury,
whereas oil presents a higher risk for environmental damage."
Although there are various reasons for pipeline accidents, safety
and environmental regulations aim to prevent and minimize the
risk of accidents and their consequences."
Undoubtedly, the
applicable legal regime reflects the applicable preventive
regulations as well as the compensation regime.' 8 A cross-border
pipeline implicates multiple legal regimes, which increases the
complexity of the applicable legal regime.' 9 To understand these
complexities we will first explain what is meant by a cross-border
pipeline.
For the purposes of this contribution, we consider a pipeline to
be "transboundary" when it traverses the border of at least two

I

Rupture & Ignition of a Gas Pipeline, FRENCH MINISTRY FOR ECOLOGY,
SUSTAINABLE
DEv.
&
Energy,
1-2
(Sept.
2009),
available
at

http://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/wpcontent/filesmflFD-27681
Ghislengheinv2004ang.pdf.
12 Belgium Gas Line Explosion,
PIPELINES
INT'L (Aug.
4,
2004),
http://www.pipelinesinternational.net/news/belgium gasline-explosion/0 10021/.
13 Rupture & Ignition, supra note 11, at 3.

14 Anothony Swift et al., Tar Sands Pipelines Safety Risks 1, 6 (Nat. Resources Def.
Council et al., 2011).
15 Id. at 7.
16 See id. ("One of the potential toxic products of a DilBit explosion is hydrogen
sulfide, a gas which can cause suffocation in concentrations over 100 parts per million
and is identified by producers as a potential hazard associated with a DilBit spill.").
17 Id. at 3; see Muhlbauer, supra note 7, at 733.
18 Paul Stevens, Cross- Border Oil & Gas Pipelines: Problems & Prospects,CTR.
FOR ENERGY, PETROLEUM, & MIN. L. & POL'Y 1, 20 (2003) ("[A] cross-border pipeline

must operate between differing legal and regulatory regimes.").
19 See id.
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countries. 2 0 However, in some cases, the pipeline only passes from
an inlet country to an output country, whether terrestrial, such as
the Iran-Turkey Gas Pipeline, 21 or subsea, such as the RussiaTurkey Gas Pipeline (Blue Stream).2 2 In other cases, a pipeline
traverses producer, transit, and consumer countries.2 3 Usually, the
cross-border pipeline will be the subject that determines the
applicable regulatory regime. 24 If a cross-border pipeline involves
a transit country, the transit country or countries will be included
in the project. 25 For example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil
Pipeline departs from Azerbaijan, passes through Georgia as
transit country, and reaches its final destination, the Ceyhan Oil
Marine Transport Terminal in Turkey.2 6
A cross-border pipeline is subject to different regulatory
regimes since it stretches beyond national borders and is
categorized as a grid-bound transport system. 27 A grid-bound
transport system means that any accident in a section of the

Herbert Smith Freehills, UK: International Law Regime of Tranboundary
Pipelines, MONDAQ (Oct. 11, 2002), http://www.mondaq.com/x/18195/intemational+
trade+investment/International+Law+Regime+of+Transboundary+Pipelines.
21 Elin Kinnader, Turkish-Iranian Gas Relationship: Politically Successful,
20

Commercially Problematic, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUD. 1, 7 (2010) (stating that

Turkey imports almost all of its natural gas resources by pipeline from Iran).
22 A. Konoplyanik, Russian Gas to Europe: From Long-Term Contracts, OnBorder Trade and Destination Clauses to ...

?, 23 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L.

282, 299 (2005).
23 Paul Stevens, Transit Troubles: Pipelines as a Source of Conflict, CHATHAM
HOUSE REP. 1, 1 (2009), available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/
r0309_pipelines.pdf.
24 See Sergei Vinogradov, Cross-BorderPipelines in InternationalLaw, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 75, 75 (1999) (discussing two approaches to cross-border
pipelines, the traditional and comprehensive approach).
25 See Stevens, supra note 23, at 1-2 (stating that there are no jurisdictions to
manage transit pipeline agreements because they are separate sovereign entities).
26 See S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell, The Baku-Tpilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline:
Oil Window to the West, CENT. ASIA-CAUCASUS INST. SILK RD. STUD. PROGRAM 1, 61-

118 (2005), available at http://www.silkroadstudies.org/BTC.htm (discussing the
implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey in
separate chapters).
27 See Steven M. Kramer & Bret A. Sumner, Electric Reliability in North America:
Cross-Border Implications, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T. 81, 81 (1999) ("It is important
to recognize that maintaining a reliable North American electric grid requires crossborder cooperation among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.").
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pipeline would disrupt the whole chain.28 Parties to a cross-border
pipeline prefer to rely on regulatory regimes that ensure security of
constant supply.2 9 In addition, transboundary impacts of a crossborder pipeline accident should not be underestimated because of
the lack of overarching regulations or a less advanced regulatory
regime. Obstacles may arise either for the prevention of accidents
or the compensation of victims.30
Most of the cross-border pipelines are constructed and
operated by Multinational Corporations (MNCs).3 ' As host states,
MNCs usually sign separate contracts with all states involved in a
cross-border pipeline project for the construction and operation of
the proposed pipeline. 32 Accordingly, environmental and safety
regulations are often provided through contractual arrangements,
as opposed to the application of national and local regulations.
This raises the question of how MNCs under such arrangements
can be held responsible for full compliance with environmental
regulations and for the protection of environmental interests.
Therefore, the true effectiveness of cross-border pipeline
regulations is highly dependent upon having an effective and
overarching international regime. 3
The cross-border character of a pipeline, and the fact that
safety regulations are often provided on a contractual basis in a
project, raises questions concerning not only the applicable
preventive regulations and their enforcement, but also the

28 See
Rafael Leal Areas, Energy Transit Activities: Collection of
Intergovernmental Agreements of Oil and Gas Transit Pipelines and Commentary,
ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT KNOWLEDGE CTR. 1, 7 (2014).

See Stevens, supra note 23, at 22 ("Governments pursue their national interests,
and these may differ.").
30 See Helena Montiel et al., HistoricalAnalysis of Accidents in the Transportation
of Natural Gas, 51 J.HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 77, 88-89, 91 (1996) (suggesting that there
may not be enough available data to provide information on victims).
31 Lea
Hanakova, Accountability of Transnational Corporations Under
International Standards 5 (July 1, 2005) (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Georgia
Law) (on file with Digital Goods, University of Georgia Law).
32 Id
33 See id. at 5-6.
34 See Sergei Vinogradov, Challenges of Nord Stream: Streamlining International
Legal Frameworks and Regimes for Submarine Pipelines, in GERMAN YEARBOOK OF
INT'L LAW: JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 241, 248 (Universittit Kiel. Institut
fir Internationales Recht ed., 2009).
29
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compensation regime." Different jurisdictions are involved in the
case when damage results from a transboundary pipeline and this
may raise compensation difficulties for victims. 6 The damage
may be imposed de facto" on the local community instead of on
the polluter.3 ' Exposing the potential polluter to damages is an
important component of victim compensation and provides
incentives for the prevention of the harm.
From an economic perspective, operators should have
incentives to follow an optimal level of care. 40 Even when
literature suggests that public regulation may be the primary
instrument for environmental and safety risks,4 1 there may be an
important supplementary role for liability rules as well. For the
purpose of this contribution, we analyze the regulatory framework
for the prevention of environmental and safety hazards in crossborder pipelines.
The crucial question at the core of this article is whether the
current structure of the legal regime applicable to cross-border
pipelines provides effective incentives for the prevention of safety
and environmental risks. Although we recognize that liability
rules will have an important supplementary effect in providing
those incentives, liability rules and compensation are matters
outside the scope of this contribution. Thus, we focus on the
environmental and safety regime applicable to cross-border
pipelines.
Using a law and economics framework, Section II provides an

35 See Hanakova, supra note 31, at 6.
36 See XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2003)

(suggesting that countries may disagree on compensation for victims given that damage
affecting more than one country is not "caused by human activities alone").
3 See John Warren Kindt, International Environmental Law & Policy: An
Overview of Transboundary Pollution, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 587 (1986)
("Polluters realize that it is uneconomical to bear the costs of polluting when those costs
can be shifted to another party or simply dumped onto the general public.").
38 Thomas W. Merill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J.
931, 932 (1997).
39 See Michael Faure & Gerrit Betlem, Applying National Liability Law to
TransboundaryPollution: Some Lessonsfrom Europe & The US., MAASTRICHT U. FAC.
OF L. 1, 2 (2009).
40 See Stevens, supra note 23, at 62, 68; see also Muhlbauer, supra note 7, at 733.
41 E.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, I (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 1218, 1983).
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overview of the potential risks cross-border pipelines can create,
such as personal injury, environmental damage, and economic
losses. Section III sketches the applicable international legal
regime to cross-border pipelines. Section IV critically evaluates
the safety and environmental regulations applicable to crossborder pipelines, arguing that there are serious flaws in the current
structure of the regulatory regime. Section V concludes.
II. Cross-Border Pipeline Risks
Although pipelines are considered relatively safe compared to
other modes of transporting hydrocarbons, the risk of accidents
and their after-effects should not be underestimated.42 A detailed
analysis of the reported accidents could give valuable insights
concerning reasons why particular preventive measures failed, the
type of damage incurred, and how the damage is compensated.4 3
Thus, in assessing the effectiveness of the regulations that aim to
prevent such accidents with cross-border pipelines, it is important
to first address and analyze some of the cross-border pipeline
accidents that have occurred in the past.44
While numerous cross-border pipeline accidents have
occurred, the exact number is difficult to ascertain.45 Indeed, data
on pipeline accidents are mainly gathered by national and
international agencies. 46 Hence, oil and gas pipeline accidents
have been prepared at the international and regional level. 47 Thus,
for a better understanding of the potential risks related to pipelines,
Lucia Citro & Roberta Valentina Gagliardi, Risk Assessment of Hydrocarbon
Releases by Pipelines, 28 CHEM. ENGINEERING TRANSACTIONs 85, 85 (2012) (It.),
availableat http://www.aidic.it/cet/12/28/015.pdf.
43 See Montiel et al., supra note 30, at 78-81; see also Peter Burgherr & Stefan
Hirschberg, Severe Accident Risks in Fossil Energy Chains: A Comparative Analysis, 33
ENERGY 538, 538-39 (2008) (Switz.) (suggesting that major accidents are more likely to
be reported and that there are a variety of failures contributing to accidents during the
transportation of oil and gas via pipelines).
44 Montiel et al., supra note 30, at 78 (noting the importance of studying the origin
of accidents through historical analysis).
45 See RAFAEL KANDIYOTI, PIPELINES: FLOWING OIL AND CRUDE POLITICs 32, 37
(2012).
46 Burgherr & Hirschberg, supra note 43, at 539; Montiel et al., supra note 30, at
79.
47 See HANQIN, supra note 36, at 32 (stating that in addition to "international
activities, states have also adopted a number of treaties on civil liability for certain ultrahazardous activities").
42
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some information will be presented based on reports of oil and gas
incidents, even if they do not all relate to cross-border accidents.
It is important to stress the distinction between accidental and
non-accidental damage.48 Pipeline accidents depend upon the
location and the type of pipeline 49 and are the result of a wide
range of causes of failure.so Accordingly, many indicators
influence the number and size of accidents and the associated
damage." Pipeline projects have distinctive features compared
with other industrial activities,5 2 which exacerbates the potential
adverse environmental impacts resulting from them." First, each
pipeline has considerable length and passes through various
sensitive environmental and residential areas creating a continuous
risk of an accident alongside a route.54 Those risks can be related
to both external reasons, such as excavation works, as well as
internal reasons like corrosion." According to the Energy-Related
Severe Accident Database (ENSAD),s' from 1969 to 1996, the
majority of all natural gas accidents involving pipelines were
caused by mechanical and impact failures." External causes and
human errors accounted for the least number of natural gas
accidents involving pipelines (the remainder was unknown)."
Moreover, the construction and operation of a pipeline requires
following the applicable state of technology, such as laying pipes

Id. at I1, 13.
See Montiel et al., supra note 30, at 80-82 (illustrating through diagrams that a
variety of factors are considered when analyzing the cause of a pipeline accident).
50 Id. at 79, 85-87.
48

49

51 W.

KENT

MUHLBAUER,

PIPELINE

RISK

MANAGEMENT

MANUAL:

IDEAS,

246 (3d ed. 2004).
52 See Burgherr & Hirschberg, supra note 43, at 543.
53 See DAVID D. KEMP, EXPLORING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH 200-01 (2004); Stefan Hirschberg et al., Severe Accidents in the Energy
Sector: Comparative Perspective, I I I J. OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 57, 64 (2004)
(Neth.).
54 Id. at 200.
55 Id.
56 Risk Assessment: ComparativeRisk Assessment and the ENSAD Database,PAUL
SCHERRER INST., http://www.psi.ch/ta/risk-assessment (last visited October 2, 2014)
(providing a comprehensive collection of severe energy related accidents).
57 Hirschberg et al., supra note 53, at 64.
58 See id.
TECHNIQUES, AND RESOURCES
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in a trench.59 These actions, apart from the potential risks of a
pipeline's spillage and explosion, can endanger sensitive
environmental areas.6 o Finally, the types of substances that are
transported through the cross-border pipelines may be categorized
as hazardous substances.' A wide range of environmental and
safety regulations has been envisaged to minimize the risks of such
accidents and any after effects. 62 Therefore, while risks may be
mitigated through higher safety standards, application of such
standards may lead to higher prices.
Natural gas, which is under high-pressure in cross-border
pipelines, is flammable and has a high potential of explosion.6
Even as a result of a small spark, a ruptured natural gas pipeline
may explode and lead to a high number of personal injuries as well
as property and environmental damage. Oil spills, which may
also occur as a result of an oil pipeline failure, can pollute the
marine and land environment.66 Oil pipelines as well as gas
pipelines may readily ignite, causing an explosion with a high
number of casualties. 67 Thus, some regulatory bodies have
classified gas 68 and oil pipelines 69 as hazardous activities due to
59 KEMP, supra note 53, at 200.
60 Id. at 200-0 1.
61 UNITED NATIONS, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods
(2011),
available
at
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/danger/publi
/unrec/rev 17/English/Rev 17_Volume I.pdf (detailing a list of hazardous substances).
62 See HANQUIN, supra note 36, at 19, 30-32 (discussing the "existing international
regimes relating to accidental damage caused by ultra-hazardous activities").
63 RAFAEL KANDIYOTI, supra note 45, at 33 ("[U]ltimate safety can be an expensive
state.").
64 See Vladimir Stevanovid, Security of Gas Pipelines Security and Reliability of
DamagedStructures and Defective Materials, in SECURITY & RELIABILITY OF DAMAGED
STRUCTURES & DEFECTIVE MATERIALS 253, 254 (Guy Pluvinage & Aleksandar Sedmak
eds., 2009) (Serb.).
65 See id. at 257 (stating that once the spark was initiated, other explosions
succeeded).
66 KEMP, supranote 53, at 200; see Hirschberg et al., supra note 53, at 64.
67 R. DENYS, PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE, BRUGHES, BELGIUM, MAY 21-24,2000 (2000).
68 Directive 2012/18/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July
2012 on the Control of Major-Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances,
amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, 2012 O.J. (L 197) 19
[hereinafter Parliament Directive].
69 United Nations Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, app. 1, Feb. 5, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 310 [hereinafter U.N.
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their chemical and physical features. 70 For a realistic and
comparative insight on oil and gas pipeline accidents, a short
report of some pipeline accidents, gathered on the basis of three
different databases, is introduced in Table 1. Due to a lack of
adequate information about incurred environmental damages and
economical losses, Table 1 displays only the number of accidents
and personal injuries. As indicated in Table 1, a considerable
number of oil and gas pipeline accidents occurred during the last
two decades with a high number of personal injuries.n

Convention].
70 See Parliament Directive, supra note 68; U.N. Convention, supra note 69.
71 Details of the environmental damage and the economic losses related to those
pipeline accidents could only be provided on a case-by case-basis.
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Table 1: ComparativeData About Oil and Gas Pipeline
Accidents in the US, Europe, and a Severe Accidents
Category
ENSAD (Only pipeline
severe

accidents with

The US (Based on the
US

Department

of

The

Western

EU

Countries

more than five

Safety)

The EGIG 72 for the

fatalities)

1992-2011

onshore gas pipelines
(1970 to 2010)

1970-2005

&
7
The CONCAWEn
for

the onshore oil
pipelines
(1970 to 2010)

Accidents

Fatalities

Accidents

Fatalities

Accidents

Fatalities

Oil

30

2500

5574

41

478

14

(hazardous

(approxima

(approxi

liquids)

tely)

mately)

Natural Gas

197

2970

4691

340

1249

Not clear

Energy
Chain

The remainder of this section describes oil and gas pipeline
accidents and their associated damage. Each subsection examines
the potentially adverse impacts of oil and gas pipeline accidents
from a theoretical point of view by focusing on personal injury,
72 See generally, About EGIG, EGIG, http://www.egig.eu/about-egig (last visited
Oct. 1, 2014) (explaining that the European Gas Pipeline Data Group (EGIG) is a
corporation that was established in 1982 with six European gas transmission system
operators to gather data on the unintentional releases of gas in their pipeline transmission
systems). The EGIG is extended to a group with fifteen major gas transmission system
operators in Western Europe and is the owner of an extensive gas pipeline-incident
database. Id.; see also Gas Pipeline Incidents: 8th Report of the European Gas Pipeline
Incident Data Group, EGIG (2011), http://www.egig.eu/uploads/bestanden/96652994-

c9af4612-8467-9bc6c2ed3fb3.
73 See generally, About Us, CONCAWE, https://www.concawe.eulcontent/default.
asp?PagelD=545 (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (explaining that CONCAWE has collected
spillage data on European cross-country oil pipelines with particular regard to spillages
volume, cleanup and recovery, environmental consequences and causes of the incidents
since 1963); see also CONCA WE Reports, CONCAWE, http://www.concawe.be/
content/default.asp?PagelD=569 (last visited Sep. 3, 2014) (maintaining a list of monthly
CONCAWE reports).
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environmental damage, and economic losses. Recent examples of
cross-border pipeline accidents are then presented as case studies.
From a legal point of view, oil and gas pipelines have similarities,
but from a technical point of view, they also have differences.74
A. Gas PipelineRisks
Gas pipeline accidents can cause personal injuries, large
economic losses, and environmental damage.7 s Construction
defects and corrosion tend to be the cause of small rupture holes,
but it is ground movement that creates great rupture hole sizes.76
The impact of such an explosion is dependent upon the various
sizes of rupture holes, but the explosions have the potential to do
catastrophic damage, leading to serious personal injuries and
property damage.77 From an economic perspective, a secure
supply of energy, in particular of natural gas, is very important.78
Any interruption of secure gas flow would be very costly for
stakeholders.79 Because interruptions can be so costly, not only is
the initial security of supply important, but restoration of gas
pipelines is likewise critical. Natural gas is transported under high
pressure and is a non-storable commodity, a so-called "network
bound energy carrier."so Consequently, if any part of a pipeline is
unable to operate and no alternative means of transportation is
available, the interruption of flow reduces the security of supply

74 David J. Ramberg, The Relationship Between Crude Oil & Natural Gas Spot
Prices & Its Stability Over Time (June 2010) (unpublished Master's thesis,
Massachusetts Institute for Technology).
75 Anderson J. Brito & Adiel T. de Almeida, Multi-Attribute Risk Assessmentfor
Risk Ranking of Natural Gas Pipelines, 94 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYs. SAFETY
187, 187 (2009) (Bra.).
76 Id. at 256.
77 Id. at 254.
78 See PHILIP ANDREWS-SPEED
& PETER D. CAMERON,
SECURITY OF
INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS: CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH PRIORITIES 2-3 (2006); see
also Hellmuth Weisser, The Security of Gas Supply-A Critical Issue for Europe?, 35
ENERGY PoL'Y 1, 1-2 (2005) (discussing the supremacy of gas energy to oil).
79 See PAUL STEVENS, CROSS BORDER OIL AND GAS PIPELINES: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 92 (2003) (discussing the Sonatrach Gas Pipeline where involved parties
share the costs involved with any interruption of Sonatrach's production in Algeria).
80 See Henryk Faas et al., European Security: A European Perspective, ENERGY
SECURITY: INT'L & LOCAL ISSUES, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES,

INFRASTRUCTURES 9, 16 (2011).
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through the entire chain of the pipeline.'
Moreover, "the restoration of gas supplies, once reconnected,
is far more complex than for oil."82 Before reconnecting, a gas
engineer must be sure that the pipeline is free from any leaks or
air." This is because the presence of either can "result in serious
explosions."8 4 Moreover, the restoration of gas flow is often
lengthy work." Long waits can endanger the security of supply
for consumers, who are dependent upon a constant supply of
natural gas. 6 Realizing this vital issue, the European Union
prescribed specific directives in relation to the security of natural
gas supply." Countries must also consider the economic impacts
of the construction of cross-border gas pipelines for neighboring
countries, even if the pipeline itself does not pass through their
territory." Finally, environmental damage, such as air, water, and
soil pollution can occur as a result of a gas pipeline accident as
81 See

JOHN HANDMER & STEPHEN DOVERS, HANDBOOK OF DISASTER POLICIES AND

INSTITUTIONS:

IMPROVING

EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

AND

CLIMATE

CHANGE

25-26 (2nd ed. 2012) (discussing how a pipeline explosion in Australia
resulted in a halt on the transport of gas throughout the area, only allowing limited
supplies of gas to top priority facilities such as hospitals).
ADAPTATION

82 See PAUL STEVENS, TRANSIT TROUBLES: PIPELINES AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT 12

(2009).
83 Id. at 12.

84 Id.; see also Explosion Kills Two Engineers Working on West Africa Gas
Pipeline, GHANAWEB (October 31, 2012), http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHome
Page/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=254924.
85 See Ghana Gas Pipeline Delayed to April-Minister, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2013,
7:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/19/ghana-gas-pipeline-idUSL5NO
HF ILS20130919.
86 E.g., Emmanuel Arma-Kofi Buah, Minister for Energy and Petroleum, Meet the
Press 2013 Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (July 4, 2013) (reporting that gas supply
has been halted for several months); Ghana Gas Pipeline, supra note 85; JOHN HANDMER
& STEPHEN DOVERs, HANDBOOK OF DISASTER POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS: IMPROVING
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 25-26 (2nd ed. 2012)

(explaining how facilities, for example hospitals, that depend on natural gas suffered
during a halt in gas flow).
87 See Council Directive 2004/67, Measures to Safeguard Security of Natural Gas
Supply, 2004 O.J. (L 127) 92; see also Directive 2003/55, Concerning Common Rules
for the Internal Market in Natural Gas, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 57.
88 See Nord Stream Ensures Unrestricted Access to Polish Ports, NORD STREAM
(March 5, 2010), http://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/press-releases/nord-streamensures-unrestricted-access-to-polish-ports-337/ (discussing Poland's concerns with
possible adverse effects the construction of the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline would have on
sea traffic and safety in Polish ports).
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well." A leak in a gas pipeline emits chemicals into the air
resulting in air pollution.90 A leak occurring in a submarine gas
pipeline adversely affects water and marine wildlife.9 '
While three theoretical risks-personal injury, economic loss,
and environmental pollution-are associated with gas pipeline
accidents, the actual reported damage is what accurately reflects
the destructive nature of cross-border pipeline accidents. 92 For this
purpose, a few recent examples of cross-border pipeline accidents
are provided in Table 2. Table 2 shows that the theoretical risks
identified can emerge as actual damage in the event of a crossborder pipeline accident.
This does not mean all pipeline
accidents will result in personal injury, economic loss, and
environmental damage. 93 However, how damage is assessed and
reported can depend on the applicable law and the place in which
the accident occurs.

89 See generally, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 470 (proposed 1978)

STATEMENT: PROPOSED 1979

(discussing air pollution and effects of pollution on water and marine wildlife); Vladimir
Stevanovi6, Security of Gas Pipelines, SECURITY & RELIABILITY OF DAMAGED
STRUCTURES & DEFECTIVE MATERIALS 253, 256 (2009); STANISLAV A. PATIN,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 220-23 (Elena
Cascio trans., Ist ed. 1999) (explaining impacts on marine environments as well as air
pollution); KEMP, supra note 53.
90 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 89, at 470 (discussing the

various forms of gas that can be released during a gas pipeline break); PATIN, supra note
89; KEMP, supra note 53.

91 See PATIN, supra note 89 (discussing how the release of gas from seepage in gasbearing structures under water can result in water pollution).
92 See Stevanovid, supra note 89, at 256-57 (recounting a chemical accident in
Russia where a petroleum gas leakage for several days caused a spark from a train to
ignite the gasses, thereby resulting in an explosion that left 462 people dead and 706
others injured).
93 Id. at 256 (discussing a pipeline accident in New Jersey that resulted in injury to
individuals and property destruction and economic loss for the state, but makes no
mention of environmental pollution).
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Table 2: Recent Examples of Cross-borderGas Pipeline
Accidents
Description

Causes of

Place of

Concerned

Personal

Damage

Losses in

of

Accidents

Accident

Countries

Injuries

to the

the

Enviro-

Economy

& Date

Pipelines

nment
transit

A

Belgium

Leakage

2004

gas pipeline

and

in

explosion

100

N/A

Norwegian

24

Belgium;

fatalities

million

More

curo

France

Ghislcnghic

than 120

n94

injured
N/A,

N/A

Eastern

Iran;

28

by

part of

Turkey

injured

Kurdish

Turkey,

was

separatists

October

stopped

The Iran-

Sabotage

Turkey Gas
Pipeline"

supply

for

2012

a

short time

N/A,

N/A

None

Eastern

Azerbaijan;

Tbilisi-

part of

Georgia;

supply

Erzurum

Turkey,

Turkey

was

Not clear

The Baku-

Gas
6

Pipeline"

October

stopped

2012

for

a

short time
Ship

August

Nigeria;

African Gas

anchor

2012 (a

Togo;

Pipeline"

ruptured
the pipeline

The West

A

large Flow was

but

stopped for

break in the Benin;

unclear

nearly one

gas

amount of year,

-

Ghana

pipeline in

natural

shortfall of

94 See Rupture & Ignition, supra note II.
95 See Explosion Rock's Iran's Gas Export Pipeline in Turkey, PREssTV (Oct. 22,
2012),

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/10/22/268050/blast-hits-iran-gas-pipeline-in-

turkey/.
96 See Explosion Hits Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline; Cause Unknown,
AZERNEWS (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.azemews.az/oilandgas/44402.html.

97 See West Africa Gas Pipeline Explosion: Ghanian President Urges Nigeria to
Intervene, CITIZEN

ONLINE

(Dec.

12,

2012),

http://thecitizenng.com/happening-

now/west-africa-gas-pipeline-explosion-ghanian-president-urges-nigeria-to-intervene/.
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300

leaked

megawatts

into

the of power

sea

production
only in
Ghana

Restoration

December

works on

2012 (an

the line

accident in

2 fatalities

Aboadze,
Ghana)

B. Oil PipelineAccidents
Similar to gas pipeline accidents, oil pipeline accidents have
the potential to cause serious personal injury, economic loss, and
environmental damage. However, the extent of the harm resulting
from oil pipeline accidents differs from that of gas pipelines
because of the distinctive features of each substance.99 The
remainder of this subsection describes the potential risks resulting
from oil transport through pipelines.
This description is
complemented with a few recent examples of cross-border oil
pipeline accidents, as shown in Table 3.
Oil can be extremely destructive due to its rapid movement
across water.'" It is this feature of oil that allows it to cause
widespread damage."o' Another dangerous feature of oil is its
flammability, which can lead to explosions causing serious
personal injury and property damage.' 02 Oil is also highly toxic to
98 See West African States Unhappy with WAPCo, GHANAWEB (March 29, 2013),
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=26941 1.
99 See EKPEN JAMES OMONBUDE, CROSS-BORDER OIL AND GAS PIPELINES AND THE
ROLE OF THE TRANSIT COUNTRY: ECONOMICS, CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 16 (2012)

(explaining the technical differences in gas and oil pipelines).
100 See MERVIN FINGAS, OIL SPILL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 196 (MERVIN FINGAS

ed., Ist ed. 2011); see also MAX BLUMER, Scientific Aspects of the Oil Spill Problem, 1
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 54, 56 (1971),
bc.edu/ealr/vol Iiss 1/4.

available at http://lawdigitalcommons.

101 Id. at 56.
102 See BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL, The Costs of Failure:A PreliminaryAssessment of

Major Energy Accidents, 1907-2007, ENERGY POL'Y 36, 1802-20 (2008).
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ingest and can lead to serious health problems in humans."o3
Therefore, the risk of harm from contamination can cause serious
personal injuries.
Also, similar to gas pipelines, interruptions in oil pipelines can
have a strong economic impact. Since oil is not transported under
high-pressure and is a storable commodity, the problem of
interruption and security of supply is less of an issue than with
natural gas. However, interruptions of oil flow in cross-border
pipelines can still lead to high costs for stakeholders. 04
Furthermore, cleanup costs should not be underestimated.'o
Though oil pipelines have differing qualities from gas pipelines,
the economic impact of oil pipeline accidents is still severe.
Disasters involving oil may be viewed as catastrophic oil spills
that pollute the oceans. In fact, "[m]ajor oil spills . . . are one of

the most serious problems of pollution from maritime transport
activities."' 6 However, oil pipeline ruptures are also extremely
destructive to the environment and wildlife.'0 o The toxicity of oil
is not just a problem for humans, but for wildlife as well.'0o
Furthermore, the damage to wildlife can last from several years to
the entire lifetime of the organism.'09
Oil vapors can also, to some extent, be hazardous to the marine
environment and its wildlife."o Moreover, leakage of oil from a
buried pipeline creates a major health risk for the quality of
103 See MAX BLUMER, supra note 100, at 54, 56 (discussing how exposure to oil can
cause cancer in humans).
104 See MAMUKA TSERETELI, The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South
Caucasus TransportationCorridor,JAMESTOwN FOUNDATION 13 (2009) (discussing the
economic loss Turkey experienced during a period of oil suspension).
105 See Dagmar Schmidt Etkin, Environmental Research Consulting, Presentation at
the Arctic and Marine Oilspill Program Technical Seminar: Worldwide Analysis of
Marine Oil Spill Cleanup Cost Factors (June 2000).
106 See JEAN-PAUL RODRIGUE, CLAUDE COMTOIS & BRIAN SLACK, THE GEOGRAPHY
OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 279 (2006).
107 See Max Blumer, Scientific Aspects ofthe Oil Spill Problem, I B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.
available at
(1971),
56
54,
REV.
L.
edulealr/vol l/issl/4.
108 Id. at 55-57 (explaining the dangers of oil exposure to marine life).

109 Id. at 56.

11 See JENNIFER ANNE HILL, OIL SPILLS AND MARINE WILDLIFE: GUIDELINES FOR A
RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE ISLE OF MULL, THE HEBRIDEAN WHALE AND DOLPHIN TRUST 38
(1999) (explaining how mammals that must periodically surface may be exposed to
vapors created by oil when exposed to the atmosphere).
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groundwater."' Thus, both marine and land environments are
exposed to the potentially adverse effects of oil pipeline accidents.
Table 3: Recent Examples of Cross-borderOil Pipeline
Accidents
Name of

Cause of

Year &

Involved

Environmental

the

the

Place

States

Pollution

Pipeline

Accident

Unecha-

N/A

Property
Damage &

&

Personal Injury

Economic
Losses
(1) Interruption

2007

Belarus;

(1) Spillage of 100

Ventspils

Latvia;

Russia;

tons of diesel fuel

of the flow

Pipeline

Belarus

Latvia

when Russian
pipeline burst in

(2)

Belarussina River,

E440,000 costs

flowing into Latvia.

of cleanup

(2) Some of the

actions

112

-

Approximately

spilled diesel fuel
polluted a 15 km
stretch of the Ulla
River...

Socidt6

Break in

2007

Switzerland;

5,400 m3 of crude oil

du

a liquid

France

France;

was discharged over

related to

50 million

Germany

Pipeline

hydro-

a 5-hectare

consequences

Sud-

carbon

land area amidst the

of this

Europcen

pipeline

nature reserve

leakage, with

(SPSE)"'

tens of
millions
devoted to

ill See IGOR S. ZEKTSER, GROUNDWATER AND THE ENVIRONMENT: APPLICATIONS FOR
THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 84 (Lorn G. Everett ed., 2000).

112 See Belarus Environment Ministry Assessing Damage of Unecha-Ventspils
Pipeline

Leak,

SENNO

REGIONAL

EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE

(Apr.

23,

2007),

http://www.senno.vitebsk-region.gov.by/en/news/region?id=64.
113 Pipeline Ruptures in Belarussian River, Moscow TIMES (Mar. 27, 2007),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/paid/2007/3/article/pipeline-ruptures-inbelarussian-river/198152.html.
114 FRENCH MINISTRY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, LESSONS LEARNT FROM

INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENTS
12
(2011),
available
content/uploads/2012/03/brochure_gbimpel20I .pdf.

at

http://impel.eu/wp-
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environmental
restoration

Enbridgc

A rupture

2010

United

(1) Over 800,000

(1) About $800

Oil

of

Michiga

States;

gallons of oil spilled

million only

Pipcline

crude oil

n, US

Canada

into Michigan, the

for cleanup

Kalamazoo River,

actions

and adjacent areas

(2) 150

(2) Oil polluted

families

wildlife habitat and

permanently

resulted in the

evacuated from
their homes"i 6

the

pipeline

closure of a large
swath of the river to
boaters and anglers

Kirkuk-

A

2010

Ceyhan

terrorist

Turkey

Oil

attack

Turkey; Iraq

Two

people

were

N/A;

killed and one

interruption of

injured

supply for

Pipeline

short run

117

C PipelinesSafety and Standards
There is a wide range of environmental and safety standards
envisaged by international, national, and private organizations to
mitigate the risk of oil and gas pipeline accidents. Even still,
pipeline accidents occur everywhere in the world. A few recent
cross-border oil pipeline accidents are presented above in Table 3.
Pipelines, similar to other industrial activities, are not completely
lis EPA,

OIL SPILL: ANSWERS

To FREQUENTLY ASKED

QUESTIONS

1 (2010),

availableat http://www.epa.gov/enbridgespill/pdfs/enbridge_fs_20100812.pdf.

116 Elizabeth McGowan & Lisa Song, 'Keystone Kops' Bungling Led to Costliest
PM),
2012,
12:39
(July
24,
BLOOMBERG
Pipeline Spill,
U.S.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-24/-keystone-kops-bungling-led-to-costliestu-s-pipeline-spill.html.

II7 Energy News Update: Two Killed in Turkish Oil Pipeline Explosion, IRAQ
ENERGY

INSTITUTE

(Aug.

I1,

2010),

http://iraqenergy.org/news/?detailof=

523&content-Two-Killed-in-Turkish-Oil-Pipeline-Explosion-
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accident-free. As Rafael Kandiyoti states, minimizing the number
of accidents can satisfy public concerns to some extent."' The
safety of pipelines, however, can only be achieved by paying an
expensive price," 9 which not all operators may be inclined to
pay. 120 Pipeline accidents occur as a result of various failures. As
the literature suggests, human misconduct is the leading cause of
Indeed, most of the accidents above
pipeline accidents.121
occurred because of technical failures, poor maintenance, or
external impacts and were therefore preventable.122 For instance,
many oil pipeline spills in Nigeria were the result of low quality
safety standards and poor maintenance by MNCs.' 2 3 According to
post-Soviet Russian statistics, the rate of pipeline accidents is
seven times greater with Russian pipelines than with European
pipelines, a discrepancy which is largely attributable to lax control
and enforcement.' 24 There were also accusations concerning poor
maintenance of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline by BP, which led to
several oil leaks in 2006.125 This report suggested further that BP
economized on the maintenance of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.126
Using the same line of reasoning, there is a considerable tendency
for polluters to externalize their costs to local communities when
the costs of compensating the victims are lower than the costs of
complying with safety regulations.127 As a result, we can conclude
that the choice of standards and of enforcement mechanisms plays
a vital role in minimizing oil and gas related accidents.

118 KANDIYOTI,supra note

45, at 32.

119 Id.
120

Id. at 33.

BURGHERR & HIRSCHBERG, supranote 43, at 8.
See also Papadakis,supra note 3; see generallyBURGHERR & HIRSCHBERG, supra
note 43 (identifying human misconduct and technical failures as principal causes of
pipeline accidents).
123 Joshua P. Eaton, Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational
Corporations,and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J. 261,
268 (1997).
124 V.D. Cherniaev et al., G.A. Vdovin, E.M. Yassin & E.R. Stravrovsky, Oil
121

122

Transportation, in

OIL

INDUSTRY

OF THE FORMER

SOVIET

UNION. - RESERVES,

EXTRACTION AND TRANSPORTATION 222 (N. Boksernan et al., eds., 1998).
125 KANDIYOTI, supra note 45, at 36.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 47.
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III. Cross-Border Pipelines: The Legal Regime
There is no one particular international law instrument, such as
a multi-lateral treaty, dealing exclusively with transboundary oil
and gas pipelines. 2 8 There are, however, some multi-lateral and
bilateral agreements that are relevant to cross-border pipelines.12 9
Most of the rules that determine the applicable legal regime to a
given cross-border pipeline can be found in such bilateral or multilateral agreements that have been entered by the states concerned,
specifically in the case of transit pipelines. 30 In other cases, crossborder pipelines are commissioned through commercial contracts
among oil and gas companies, including state-owned companies,
e.g., the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline."' There are also some crossborder pipelines that are commissioned via state contracts. This
type of contract is entered between a host state and investors or
operators (private parties).132
Since there is no uniform
international legal regime, each cross-border pipeline has its own
specific legal framework. The details of such a framework are
determined by the corresponding agreement, thereby giving rise to
the particular cross-border pipeline.
The relevant international and regional conventions are not
exclusively focused on cross-border pipelines. First, we will
discuss cross-border pipeline agreements, as they are the most
important source of law on this topic. Next, we will examine the
following relevant international conventions: the Energy Charter
Treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and
the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a

See Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 75.
129 Id. at 76.
130 See, e.g., Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Transmission of Natural Gas
through a Pipeline between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2005, Cm. 6675, art. 2 (Neth.) [hereinafter
Framework Agreement 2005]; Agreement Relating to the Transportation of Petroleum
Via the Territories of the Azerbaijan Republic, Georgia and the Republic of Turkey
through the Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline art. 2, Nov. 18, 1999 [hereinafter
Agreement Among the Azerbaijan Republic, Georgia and the Republic of Turkey].
131 T. Koivurova & 1. Polonen, Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment in
128

the Case of the Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline, 25 INT'L. J. MARINE & COASTAL LAW 151, 156-

57 (2010).
132 See, e.g., The Convention of Establishment between the Republic of Cameroon
and the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company (COTCO), 1998, Law 97-16
[hereinafter COTCO Convention].
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Transboundary Context.
A. Cross-BorderPipelineAgreements
Each cross-border pipeline has its distinct characteristics, given
that there are different parties with disparate interests. 33
Consequently, distinctive regulatory regimes have been
implemented for both existing and planned pipelines, with the
agreements governing pipelines taking one of two general forms:
framework agreements or ad hoc agreements. 3 4 The first group
establishes a general set of rules and regulations concerning the
construction and operation of the cross-border pipelines between
two states within a framework agreement, e.g., the Norway-UK
Agreement.13' The latter group deals only with the construction
and operation of a specific cross-border pipeline.136 An example
of an ad hoc agreement is the West African Gas Pipeline
(WAGP).' 3
Cross-border pipelines can be classified as either
offshore or onshore pipelines, depending on the geography they
traverse; from a technical point of view, onshore and offshore
cross-border pipelines have distinctive features and consequently
need to be regulated differently, especially in terms of
environmental regulations.13
However, whether the pipelines
concerned are offshore or onshore, most cross-border pipeline
agreements usually employ a similar structure and are formulated
on the basis of established models. For the purposes of this Note,
bilateral and multilateral cross-border pipeline agreements are
See Stevens, supra note 23, at 1-2 .
Compare Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cross-Boundary Petroleum Cooperation, 2005, Cm 6792 (Nor.) [hereinafter Framework Agreement 2007] (setting out
broader agreements concerning the sharing of petroleum resources generally), with
Framework Agreement 2005, supra note 130 (narrowing the scope of the agreement to
focus on a particular pipeline project).
135 E.g., Framework Agreement 2007, supra note 134, art. 2.
136 Framework Agreement 2005, supra note 130, art. 2.
137 See generally About the Pipeline,WEST AFRICAN GAS PIPELINE COMPANY (2014),
http://www.wagpco.com/index.php?option=com-content&view-article&id=1 22&Itemid
=84&lang-en (describing the West African Gas Pipeline as a natural gas pipeline
supplying gas from Nigeria's Escravos region of the Niger Delta area to Benin, Togo and
Ghana). The intergovernmental agreement was concluded between the countries in
interest in 2003. Id.
138 See generally J.C. Bugler, Pipeline Safety Regulation, in MAJOR HAZARDS
ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE 11 (Norbert Gibson ed., 1995) (discussing the differences
between onshore and offshore pipelines).
133

134
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divided into ad hoc agreements and framework agreements.
1. Cross-BorderPipelineAd hoc Agreements
For purposes of this section, cross-border pipelines will be
subdivided into two categories: transit and non-transit pipelines.
Non-transit pipelines are constructed for the purpose of
transporting oil and gas from one country, the supplier, to another
country, the consumer. Such a cross-border pipeline could be a
submarine, as is the case with the Interconnector Pipeline
connecting the UK to Belgium;' 39 or terrestrial, such as the IranTurkey Gas Pipeline. 4 0 In this type of arrangement, the ownership
of both the pipeline and the gas flowing within it is transferred
from one state to the other at the border.141 By contrast, a transit
pipeline starts in a supplier country, passes through a transit
country or transit countries and ends in a consumer area.142 An
example of a transit pipeline is the Druzhba Oil Pipeline, which
runs from Russia to Europe.14 3 Each transit pipeline agreement has
at least three parties in interest, each located in a different
sovereign entity.14 4 In some cases, the transit state may also be a
purchaser of the oil and gas transported through the pipeline as is,
for example, the case with the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline. 4 5
Parties concerned in a transit project usually conclude an ad hoc
agreement for commissioning a cross-border pipeline.14 6 Ad hoc
agreements are also common when the parties merely plan to

construct one pipeline.14 7
139 See generally MARK FUTYAN, THE INTERCONNECTOR PIPELINE: A KEY LINK IN
EUROPE'S GAS NETWORK (2006) (describing the role of the Interconnector pipeline in

connecting British and European gas networks).
140 See Kinnader, supra note 21.
141 See Stevens, supra note 23, at 1.
142 Id.
143 FRASER CAMERON, THE POLITICS OF EU-RUSSIA ENERGY RELATIONS 28 (2010).

144 See Stevens, supra note 23, at 1-2.
145 See Host Government Agreement Between and Among the Government of
Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, BP Exploration Limited,
Totalfinaelf E&P Caucasian Gas SA, LUKAgip N.V., Naftiran Intertrade Co. Limited,
Statoil Azerbaijan, Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company Limited art. 4, Apr. 17, 2002
[hereinafter Host Agreement 2002] (conferring upon Georgia the right to divert five
percent of the pipeline's annual gas flow).
146 See generally Stevens, supra note 23 (describing the nature of cross-border
pipeline relations between nations).
I47 Id.
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a. The InterconnectorModel
Some authors suggest that there are two models of crossborder pipeline ad hoc agreements: the interconnector model and
the unified model.148 In the interconnector model, each section of
a pipeline falls under the jurisdiction of the state over whose
territory it passes and is governed by that state's national law.149
Usually, the interconnector system connects each national segment
of a pipeline at the borders of relevant states. 50 In other words,
the ownership of the pipeline and of the gas or oil is transferred to
another state at the border."'
Several cross-border pipeline
agreements have been constructed according to the interconnector

system.152
In the interconnector model, the safety and environmental
regulations of pipelines fall under the jurisdiction of the applicable
national law.'5 3 Therefore, each segment of a pipeline would be
regulated according to different applicable laws. As a result, these
model agreements do not deal with safety and environmental
regulations directly. The only matter that is indirectly related to
safety is the security of guaranteeing a constant supply. As the
anecdotal evidence above illustrates, the constant supply of gas
and oil can be interrupted as a result of an accident. This
interruption in turn endangers the security of a constant supply, in
the case of gas pipelines in particular.15 4 An accident in any
segment of a pipeline can threaten the interests of all stakeholders.
Thus, in order to ensure the uninterrupted flow of energy, the
indemnification of the interruption losses is often embedded in the
intergovernmental arrangement, as a contractual provision.15 It is
148 Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 75; see also Rainer Lagoni, Pipelines, in VIII
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 315, 315 (2011).
149 Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 75; Framework Agreement 2005, supra note 130;
see also FUTYAN, supra note 139, at 22.
150 Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 75.
151See KINNANDER,supra note 21, at 7-8.
152 See generally FUTYAN, supra note 139 (explaining that in projects such as the
Interconnector pipeline, a unified entity owns the overall length of the pipeline and the
gas on both sides of the border).
153 Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 75.
154 OMONBUDE, supra note 99, at 4.
155 TSERETELI, supra note 104, at 13 (demonstrating if the pipeline should be
damaged and closed because of any failure of the State Authorities, such as protecting
the pipeline and its facilities, the government must compensate for such damage
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of note that the international or regional obligations of the states
concerned may be recalled for the construction or the operation of
such pipelines."' In other words, the states concerned might have
already committed to comply with other regional or international
treaties. In such cases, they may cite such commitments in
relation to those in the text of cross-border pipeline agreements. 7
b. The Unified Model
The unified model establishes an overarching legal framework
for the entire length of a pipeline.'
In this model, cross-border
pipelines are constructed based on uniform regulations.'5 9 The
Energy Charter Treaty Conference recommended this model
through two model agreements: intergovernmental and host
governmental agreements.' 60 The intergovernmental agreement is
an agreement under international law concluded by and among all
states concerned, including transit states.' 6'
The host
governmental agreement is concluded between a host stateconcerning the development, construction, and operation of a
pipeline-and foreign investors-governing the respective rights
and obligations of the foreign investor.162
In this type of
arrangement, a consortium of multinational companies usually acts
as an operator over the entire length of the pipeline.'6 ' Thus, the

according to Articles 10, 11 & 12 of the Host Government Agreement Between and
among The Government of the Republic of Turkey and investors). A PKK (Kurdish
separatists) attack on the BTC pipeline on Aug. 5, 2008 in the Turkish section of the
pipeline, transporting 850,000 barrels/day of Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) oil and
Shah-Deniz condensate, costing Turkey $300,000 a day and oil exports were
immediately suspended thereafter. John C.K. Daly, Turkey and the Problems With the
BTC, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (Aug. 13, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.jamestown.

org/single/?tx-ttnews%5Btt news%5D=33887&no cache=1#.VDIH7SIdUjA.
156 See Framework Agreement 2005, supra note 130, art. 2 (acknowledging the rules
of international law concerning the protection of the environment from pollution,
including those reflected in Part XII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea).
157 Id.
158 Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 75.
159 Id.
160 See The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 (revised in
2004) [hereinafter The Energy Charter Treaty].
161 See, e.g., Host Agreement 2002, supranote 145.
162 Id.
163 See Catherine Redgwell, Contractual and Treatjy Arrangements Supporting
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operator implements uniform regulations over the cross-border
pipeline, notwithstanding the potential conflicts with national and
local regulations of the host state.'" By applying the unified
regulatory model in all member states, the problem of applying
different standards to one pipeline no longer arises. Generally, the
states concerned have two different ways of implementing a
unified regulatory model. They may either adopt the application
of uniform regulations, thus excluding the enforcement of local
and national regulations,16 5 or give priority to the enforcement of
national regulations.' 66 Consequently, the measure of public
participation in the construction of a proposed cross-border
pipeline will differ depending on which of the two mechanisms is
employed.
The unified regulatory regime may apply just one legal system
to the entire pipeline.'16
However, since a unified regulatory
regime can also imply the exclusion of the application of local
regulations, conflicts often arise.168
Nation states, if their
bargaining power allows it, will seek to apply their own national
law to protect local interests.' 6 1 On the other hand, investors will

Large European Transboundary Pipeline Projects: Can Adequate Human Rights and
Environmental Protection Be Secured?, in ENERGY NETWORKS

AND THE LAW:

INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS INCHANGING MARKETS 102, 107 (Martha M. Roggenkamp et al.,
eds., 2012).
164 We will discuss this issue in detail infra Chapter IV.
165 See Host Agreement 2002, supra note 145, art. 12 (stating that safety and
environmental regulations decreed in the agreement text were given priority over local
and national environmental and safety regulations).
166 See, e.g., Christian Pliiss, Gunthard Niederbdumer & Rolf Sagesser, Risk
Assessment of the Transitgas Pipeline, 45 PIPES & PIPELINES INT'L 33, 34 (2000)

(illustrating the case of the North Sea-Italy Transit Gas Pipeline where the transit state,
Switzerland, implemented its own local regulations on the pipeline because its federal
environmental protection law requires a risk assessment before construction of new
pipelines).
167 Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 77 (referring to a pipeline between Great Britain,
Ireland, and Belgium as similar to most pipelines because there is no single regime for
the pipeline and instead, jurisdiction is divided at the border of the states' continental
shelves); see also Stevens, supra note 23, at 14 (2009); see also Redgwell, supra note
163, at 117.
168 See generally Stevens, supra note 23; see also Redgwell, supra note 163, at 117.
169 RICHARD B. KUPREWICz,

GENERAL OBSERVATION ON THE MYTH OF A BEST

INTERNATIONAL PIPELINE STANDARDS 9 (2007) (applying national law depends on the

existence of national regulations in relation to the construction and operation of oil and
gas pipelines).
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undoubtedly prefer to implement uniform codes of conduct rather
than applying fragmented government regulations.
As a
consequence of allowing each state to apply its own regulations,
the thickness of the pipe or the depth at which it has to be buried
could theoretically differ.'
c. The Choice
The choice of a particular model (interconnector or unified)
has important consequences for the applicable legal regime. A
transit pipeline can be owned or leased by a shipper of oil and gas,
or can be owned by a state-owned company."' When a transit
pipeline is owned by a transit state, the regulatory regime is similar
to the intergovernmental system.'7 2 As argued formerly, each
segment of a pipeline falls under the jurisdiction of the respective
state, whereas a new regulatory regime may appear when a shipper
of gas owned or leased the transit pipeline."'
This played a role in the TransMed Pipeline, which is a gas
pipeline that stretches from Algeria to Italy with transit via
Tunisia.'74 In this project, Sonatrach, a state-owned Algerian
company, constructed the Algerian segment of the pipeline. Eni, a
state-owned Italian company, constructed the transit segment,
including the Tunisian section and Sicily channel in the
Mediterranean Sea. 7 5
2. Cross-BorderPipelineFrameworkAgreements
Some countries, particularly neighboring states such as the US
and Canada, have a high amount of energy trade.176 Countries
even share oil and gas fields, as do the UK and Norway. ' In
order to maximize the related industrial benefits, these countries

172

Id. (explaining how appropriate thickness of a transit pipeline is calculated).
See Konoplyanik, supra note 22, at 282.
Id. at 298-99.

'73

Id. at 299.

170
171

174 Id.; see also STEVENS, supra note 23, at 10.

supra note 23, at 19; see also Konoplyanik, supra note 22, at 299.
John Bishop Ballem, International Pipelines: Canada-United States, 18

175 STEVENS,
176

CANADIAN Y. B. OF INT'L L. 146, 146-47 (1980).

177 Martha M. Roggenkamp, Petroleum Pipelines in the North Sea: Questions of
Jurisdiction and Practical Solutions, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 92, 92
(1998).
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have several cross-border pipelines for gathering and transporting
oil and gas with framework agreements of general applicability. 7 8
Basically, terms of general applicability mean that all terms,
including environmental and safety standards, can be applied to all
transboundary pipelines between the respective states.17 9
However, as state practices have shown, this does not necessarily
exclude further bilateral agreements between the respective
parties.so Framework agreements can be used for both onshore
and offshore pipelines, however, it should be emphasized that the
probability of transboundary pollution is much higher in offshore
pipelines than in the case of onshore pipelines due to the fluidity of
the marine environment.'8 ' Thus, such pollution following of
water circulation patterns may travel through a shared watercourse
among riparian states.'82 For that reason, offshore pipelines often
require different arrangements. Moreover, the contents and
structure of such framework agreements may also differ,
depending upon the interests of the parties involved. In some
arrangements, only general rules are decreed in the text of the
agreement.'
Accordingly, safety and environmental regulations
have not been articulated in the text of the agreement and are to be
developed by other possible means that are elaborated by the
agreements such as an ad hoc consultation group, etc.' 84 For
instance, in Article IV of the US-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty
1977, safety and environmental regulations of transit pipelines are
subject to regulations established by the appropriate governmental
authorities having jurisdiction over the respective pipelines.'85
Therefore, the type of standards, EIA procedures, inspection
mechanisms, and even mutual consultation were not determined
by the agreement and should be specified by other possible

178

Id. at 100.

179 Id.
180 Id. at 101; see, e.g., Ballem, supra note 176, at 155 (explaining that Canada and
the U.S. signed a pipeline framework agreement, the Pipeline Transit Treaty in 1977,
which was thereafter followed by the Northern Natural Gas Pipeline agreement, which
specifically deals with one project).
181 Roggenkamp, supra note 177, at 98.
182
183
184
185

Id.
Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 76.
Roggenkamp, supra note 177, at 108.
See, e.g., Ballem, supra note 176, at 158-59.
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instruments.' 86
Interestingly, in some of the framework agreements, although
environmental and safety regulations are basically determined by
the authorities having jurisdiction over the pipeline, an adaptation
of common safety and environmental standards is allowed under
the terms of such agreements."' The parties involved have the
duty to share all the relevant information, granting permission to
officials of another state for the physical access to any
infrastructure relating to the cross-border pipeline at all stages.'
In sum, states with a large amount of hydrocarbon trade via
pipelines are likely to create framework agreements that determine
general terms of construction and operation of the pipeline while
other material terms such as environmental and safety standards
are determined through further agreements or other commercial
arrangements.189 This model has also been used for inter-field'"
pipelines such as the Norway-UK pipeline.' 9 '
Given the
complexity of the regulatory regime in the transit pipelines,
however, this model has yet to be applied to transit pipelines.' 92
As mentioned earlier, most framework agreements hold that
environmental and safety regulations should be determined by the
state with sovereignty rights over the pipeline.' 93 It is also possible
for the states involved to prescribe a uniform set of environmental
and safety rules for the entire length of the cross-border pipeline
between two states.194 However, establishing a general set of rules
for all cross-border pipelines generalizes the scope of the
agreement. One should keep in mind that each pipeline may have
different technical and legal features depending upon whether oil
86 Id
187 E.g., Framework Agreement 2007, supra note 134.
188 Framework Agreement 2005, supra note 130.
189 Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 77.
190 Roggenkamp, supra note 177, at 95.
'9'

Id.

Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 78 ("Compared to submarine pipelines, on-land
cross-border pipelines, which remain entirely within national territories of different
states, do not enjoy similar status in international law. Some general conventions may
apply to these pipelines either by analogy, or if the states concerned decide so.").
193 Id. at 77; see, e.g., Framework Agreement 2007, supra note 134, at 9-10.
192

194 But see Vinogradov, supra note 24, at 77 (describing that jurisdiction is divided
at the border of the states' continental shelves in the pipeline between Great Britain,
Ireland, and Belgium and that this is "[iln common with most pipelines").
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or gas is transported, for example. Consequently, only a limited
number of issues can be addressed through general terms in a
framework agreement.' 5 As a result, a framework agreement
always needs to be complemented by a specific agreement,
protocol, or commercial contract so as to lessen potential
aftereffects of accidents.'9 6
B. Internationaland Regional Instruments
While there are no specific international or regional
environmental agreements dealing specifically with the
construction and operation of cross-border pipelines or the
regulation of environment and safety relating to cross-border
pipelines,'97 there are a number of international and regional
treaties that are relevant for safety and environmental aspects of
cross-border pipelines such as the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS),1 98 the Energy Charter
Treaty,' 99 and the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991 (the Espoo
Convention).20 0 Most of those instruments have a more general
character and address transboundary pollution. 2 0' To some extent,
their provisions can also be extended and applied to cross-border
pipelines.

195 Id. at 76-77.
196 Id.

197 Id. at 75 ("Whereas other areas of international transport and communicationsmaritime and river navigation, railroad, automobile or civil aviation-have been the
subject of extensive regulatory efforts at the multilateral level, the same cannot be said
about international oil and gas pipeline transport.").
198 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
199 The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Energy
Charter].
200 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Feb. 5, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800 (1991) [hereinafter Espoo].
201 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 207-12; see also Energy Charter, supra note 199
at 3; see also Espoo, supra note 200, at 3 ("The Parties to this Convention . . . [are]
determined to enhance international co-operation in assessing environmental impact in
particular in a transboundary context.").
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1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
1982 (UNCLOS)
a. Generally
Offshore pipelines are subject to regulations under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). 20 2
UNCLOS includes regulations for the construction and operation
of submarine pipelines aimed at protecting the marine environment
and preventing transboundary pollution.203 In addition, UNCLOS
briefly covers liability issues in the case of offshore pipeline
accidents. 204 According to UNCLOS, submarine pipelines can
theoretically be laid in territorial water, in the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ), the continental shelf, and in the high seas.205
b. The Right to Lay Pipelines
Roggenkamp 206 categorizes offshore pipelines beyond the
territorial maritime border of the coastal state into three groups:
intra-field, inter-field, and transportation pipelines. 20 7 Intra-field
pipelines link the offshore field with the production installation.208
Inter-field pipelines connect a number of fields or installations.209
According to Roggenkamp, considering inter-field pipelines as
part of offshore installations entails meeting certain criteria, and,
therefore, not all inter-field pipelines can necessarily be
categorized as such.2"o Transportation pipelines, however, connect
offshore installations to the coast or, in some instances, a terminal
on the coast of another state.2 11 Offshore pipelines can be
characterized as an integral part of offshore installations or they
can be recognized as transportation pipelines for jurisdictional
212
Each of these groups has distinctive features under
purposes.
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

UNCLOS, supra note 198, at 25.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 61.
Id.; see also Roggenkamp, supranote 177, at 95.
Roggenkamp, supra note 177, at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 96.
Roggenkamp, supra note 177, at 92.
Id. at 92-93.
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UNCLOS. According to Article 79 of UNCLOS, transportation
pipelines that may pass through the continental shelf and EEZ of
other states have a sui generis character under international law.213
While coastal states cannot impede their construction, the
delineation of the course for laying such pipelines on the
continental shelf is subject to the consent of coastal states. 2 14
Moreover, a coastal state can ask for additional safety and
environmental regulations in order to protect existing installations
and the marine environment on its continental shelf and in the
EEZ. 21 5 The pipeline's operator may also be obligated to act under
the law of a source country, place of registration, or another
jurisdiction.2 16 For instance, in some countries such as Norway,
the nation's own regulations should be applied to the entire length
of pipelines that originated from that nation, regardless of where
they are laid. 217 The construction of a submarine pipeline within
the recognized territory of a coastal state subjects the pipeline to
the coastal state's national laws. 2 18 Articles 58 and 79 of
UNCLOS detail the guidelines for pipelines in the EEZ and on the
continental shelf.219 Article 58 of UNCLOS determines the rights
and duties of states in the EEZ.2 2 0 This Article recognizes the right
of all states to lay submarine pipelines in the EEZ. 22 ' Further, it
asserts that all states shall have due regard to the rights and duties
of coastal states and shall comply with the laws and regulations
adopted by coastal states.2 22
Therefore, an operator of a pipeline shall comply with the
regulations of the respective coastal state, regardless of any other
regulations that may also govern the pipeline.2 23 Similarly, Article
79 of UNCLOS emphasizes the right of all states to lay submarine

213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

See Vinogradov, supranote 34, at 22.
UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 79.
Id. art. 79(2).
Roggenkamp, supra note 177, at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 58(3).
Id. arts. 58, 79.
Id.art. 58.
Id. art. 58(1).
Id. art. 58(3).
Id.
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pipelines on the continental shelf.224 However, this right is limited
as coastal states have the right "to take reasonable measures for the
exploration of the continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural
resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
likely resulting from pipelines."2 25 Furthermore, it is expressly
stipulated that laying a pipeline on the continental shelf is subject
to the consent of coastal states.2 26 However, a coastal state may
not impede laying or operating such pipelines on its continental
shelf for the aforementioned reasons.22 7
Tullio Treves argues that under UNCLOS, conflicts can arise
between the freedom to lay cables and pipelines in the EEZ and on
the continental shelf, and, on the other hand, the recognized rights
and jurisdiction of coastal states.228 One could, for example, claim
that a coastal state could, de facto through the conditions which it
imposes concerning the delineation of the course of the pipeline,
deny or impede the laying of the particular pipeline.2 29 Such
Conflicts arose, for
conflicts have occurred in practice.2 30
example, between Norway and Denmark concerning the safety
requirements to be applied in the case of the Ekofisk-Emden
pipeline in the Danish section, where Denmark was the transit
state.23
On the other hand, UNCLOS allows all states to lay submarine
pipelines on the seabed beyond the continental shelf.23 2 Both landlocked and coastal states enjoy this right.233 However, UNCLOS
does not grant sovereignty rights over the area where a pipeline is

224

UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 79(1).

225 Id. art. 79(2).

Id. art. 79(3).
79(5).
228 See Tullio Treves, The International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea and the Oil
and Gas Industry, SECOND INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS CONFERENCE - MANAGING RISK
226

227 Id. art.

- DISPUTE AVOIDANCE AND RESOLUTION 10-11 (2007) (noting that many pollution

disputes can be settled throuh proceedings before domestic tribunals or private
international arbitration); see also Roggenkamp, supra note 177, at 105-06 (discussing,
for example, the conflict between Norway and Denmark concerning safety requirements
of the Ekofisk-Emden pipeline in the Danish section as a transit state).
229 Roggenkamp, supra note 177.
230 Id. at 106.
231 Id.

232 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 112.
233 Id.
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laid. 234 As a result, on the high seas, contrary to the continental
shelf, states cannot impede the construction of new pipelines under
the pretense of protecting existing pipelines in the area.2 35 Rather,
states planning to install new pipelines should take reasonable
measures not to damage existing pipelines.236 Nevertheless, since
pipelines in the high seas do not yet exist, the issue is not a focal
point of this research.
c. EnvironmentalRegulations
UNCLOS contains relevant rules concerning cross-border
pipelines.237 In this respect, a distinction can be made between the
duties of the coastal states for the prevention of accidents under
their jurisdiction and the responsibilities of the respective states for
the prevention of transboundary pollution.
Article 145 of
UNCLOS holds that a related authority shall adopt appropriate
regulations for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution
and other hazards to the marine environment in the high seas,
including both the land-based pipelines and pipelines connected to
the offshore facilities and installation, unless other arrangements
had been prescribed.
In addition, Articles 207 and 208 of UNCLOS aim to protect
the marine environment." The Articles distinguish between landbased pipelines and pipelines connected to an offshore installation,
and have different rules applicable to both. 2 4 0 Article 207 contains
general rules for land-based pipelines.2 4 1 Land based pipelines are
used to transport hydrocarbons from one coast to another.242 One
such example, the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline, passes between
Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea. 243 Article 208
Vangah Francis Wodie, The High Seas, in INTERNATIONAL LAw: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND PROSPECTS 885, 893 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
235 Id.
236 UNCLOS, supra note 198, arts. 113-14.
237 Id. arts. 87, 112-13.
238 Id. art. 145.
239 Id. arts. 207-08.
240 Id.
241 Id. art. 207.
242 Alexander Lott, Marine Environmental Protection and Transboundary Pipeline
Projects:A Case Study of the Nord Stream Pipeline, 27 MERKOURIOS-UTRECHT J. INT'L
234

& EUR. L. 55, 56 (2011).
243

Id.
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concerns offshore activities under the jurisdiction of coastal states,
including industrial installations.2 44 As we mentioned earlier,
inter-field pipelines (between different oil fields) are assumed to
be an integral part of offshore installations and hence are not
considered transportation pipelines (rather as a part of the offshore
installation). 245
Article 207 obliges states to comply with
internationally recommended rules and standards. 2 46 Article 208
is, however, much more flexible and provides coastal states with
the discretionary power to adopt appropriate regulations.24 7 Article
207 thus addresses transportation pipelines, whereas Article 208
deals with inter-field and intra-field pipelines.2 48
Both articles mention the duty to establish and follow regional
standards and procedures aimed at the prevention, reduction, and
control of pollution of the marine environment. 249 According to
Article 207, in establishing regional standards, states should take
into consideration the specific characteristics of the area, including
the regional features and economic capacity for establishing
regional rules. 250 The importance of these regional considerations
becomes apparent when neighboring coastal states convene to
establish regional standards and each asserts its own opinion
regarding varying levels of protection. 251 Hence, this problem can
arise in the case of transportation pipelines (Article 207) but not
for inter-field and intra-field pipelines.2 52 The latter are in
principle subject to the domestic regulations of coastal states.: In
the same line of reasoning, Yoshifumi Tanaka argues that under
UNCLOS, the obligations of states to prevent pollution from land244
245
246

UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 208.
Roggenkamp, supra note 177, at 95.
See PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE

PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 373 (2012) (arguing that because the provisions of Article 207

have been followed by regional and global instruments the article now reflects customary
international law).
247 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 208 (requiring further that Articles 60 and 80,
which deal with offshore installations on the continental shelf and in the EEZ, are to be
followed).
248 Id. arts. 207-08.
249 Id.

250 Id. art. 207(4).
251 Id.

252 Id. arts. 207-08.
253 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 208.

CROSS-BORDER PIPELINE SAFETY

2014

91

based sources (Article 207) prove less demanding than those
concerning sea-bed sources which are subject to the national
jurisdiction of the coastal state (Article 208).254 Article 207 states
are merely required to "take into account" internationally agreed
regulations, whereas Article 208 stipulates that the states adopt
laws and regulations which shall be no less effective than
international rules and standards. 255 Article 206 of UNCLOS
recognizes the right of a coastal state to assess the potential
impacts of activities falling within its jurisdiction that might cause
substantial or significant changes to the marine environment. 25 6
The Convention emphasizes several times the deference to the
coastal states for their own environmental regulations on the
continental shelf.25 7 Thus, it could be stressed that all activities,
including innocent passage and other legitimate conduct within the
continental shelf and the EEZ of a coastal state, are governed by
the environmental and safety regulations of that state.258
In order to prevent transboundary pollution, Article 194 of
UNCLOS details some measures to prevent and control pollution
of the marine environment. 25 9 According to the first paragraph of
this article, states individually or jointly shall take necessary
measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source by using the best practicable means
in accordance with their capabilities. 2 60 This article indirectly
considers transboundary pollution as it suggests that states
harmonize their policies and take steps to ensure that they do not
cause environmental damage to other states. 26 1 Although this
254 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Regulation of Land-Based Marine Pollution in International
Law: a Comparative Analysis Between Global and Regional Legal Framework, 66
ZEITSCHRIFT

FUER

AUSLAENDISCHES

OEFFENTLICHES

RECHT

UND

VOELKERRECHT

[HEIDELBERG J. OF INT'L LAW] 535, 543 (2006).
255 Id.

256 Id. at 566-68 (listing several regional instruments containing the obligation of
undertaking the EIA for contracting parties, including Article 7(1) of the 1992 Helsinki
Convention, Article 6 of the 1992 OSPAR Convention, and Article VIII(1) of the 1990
Kuwait Protocol to the Kuwait Regional Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources).
257 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 129 (2012).

258 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 206.
259 Id. art. 194.

260 See Tanaka, supra note 254, at 542 (proposing that this article covers both land
and sea based activities).
261 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 194(2).
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article does not mandate joint cooperation, the recognition of such
collaboration can be considered the first step toward the
transboundary environmental impact assessment that was created
following the Espoo Convention in 1991, and which will be
discussed below.2 62
The second paragraph of Article 194 outlines the duties of
States to prevent transboundary pollution resulting from activities
under their jurisdiction.2 63 Further, Article 195 acknowledges the
possible transfer of pollution from one state into other states.264
According to this article, states shall not directly or indirectly
transfer damages or hazards from one area to another. 265 This
article generally identifies transboundary pollution and the states'
obligations to prevent transboundary pollution that could
potentially result from that accident. 266 Nevertheless, states have
the discretion to regulate the methods and instruments used to
prevent this transboundary pollution from occurring. 267 However,
deference to each nation's laws should be complemented by
setting appropriate
regional
environmental
standards.26 8
Otherwise, the inconsistencies of the regulations might disrupt the
ecological balance of the marine environment due to the
application of different standards.26 9 In such cases, an adjacent
state may implement a lower quality type of standard concerning
the prevention of environmental pollution. As a result, some
challenges may emerge among neighboring states due to the lack
of a comprehensive environmental framework. This is the classic
example of a transboundary externality: in the absence of an
international regulatory regime, states may reap the benefits from
economic exploration of pipelines and externalize harm to their
262 See infra ch. 3, sec. B, pt. 3.
263 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 194(2).
264 Id. art. 194(3).
265 Id. art. 194.
266

Id.
Id.
268 Id.art. 194(l).
269 Alexander Korshenko & Alvin Gasim Gul, Pollution of the Caspian Sea, in THE
267

CASPIAN SEA ENVIRONMENT 109 (Aleksey N. Kosarev ed., 2005) (describing the Caspian

Sea as the world's largest inland sea with a unique ecosystem that has been threatened by
oil and gas activities, including the exploitation and production by some costal states). In
the absence of marine environmental standards, some states might externalize pollution
cost by applying lower quality standards). Id.

2014

CROSS-BORDER PIPELINE SAFETY

93

neighbors.270
For instance, the oil company, BP, has oil
exploration and extraction activities in the Azerbaijan section of
the Caspian Sea.27' Iran claims that these exploration and
extraction activities caused pollution in Iranian marine coastal
waters and that a complaint will be filed with international
tribunals if pollution in the Caspian Sea by BP continues.2 72
Article 213 of UNCLOS aims to enforce the aforementioned
Article 207. The Article mentions that states shall take other
measures necessary to implement applicable international rules
and standards established through competent international
organizations or diplomatic conferences to prevent, reduce, and
control pollution of the marine environment from land-based
sources. 27 3 However, since this article does not make clear which
precise enforcement mechanisms are preferred, enforceability of
Article 213 of UNCLOS is doubtful.2 74
In sum, it can be held that UNCLOS not only emphasizes the
importance of pollution resulting from offshore pipelines, but also
highlights the transboundary impact and duties of respective states,
not only coastal states, to prevent such pollution by adopting
internationally recommended standards. Moreover, UNCLOS
takes into account the problem of applying double standards to a
pipeline and its aftereffects. This problem was addressed by
focusing on regional features and economic capacities of the
respective states.
d. Conclusion
The obligations contained in UNCLOS are vague and
imprecise. As a result, UNCLOS leaves many ambiguities or
simply suggests states to draft regulatory solutions without any
270 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 213. .
271 See generallyKorshenko & Gul, supra note 269.
272 See Iran Likely to Sue Azerbaijan for Polluting Caspian Sea, FARS NEWS
AGENCY (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.payvand.com/news/I3/jan/1243.htm.
273 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 213.
274 For instance, in The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Ireland
invoked Article 213 for the implementation of standards established through competent
international organizations or diplomatic conferences. NATALIE S. KLEIN, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT INTHE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 150-52 (2005). However,

the UNCLOS Tribunal pointed out the flexible terminology adopted by UNCLOS and
then argued that most of the provisions of Part XII (Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment) are in the nature of soft law. Id.
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precise suggestions.27 5 UNCLOS does not impose an express
obligation on states to establish a regional framework or
harmonize standards and other measures in order to prevent
transboundary pollution.276 Accordingly, a pipeline operator might
lay an offshore pipeline in the jurisdiction of a state with less
effective regulations and enjoy the state's advantages.277 In
addition, although transboundary pollution is recognized as a
source of conflict, UNCLOS does not prescribe a clear duty for the
States to regulate and prevent such pollution from all sources,
including pipelines.2 78 When UNCLOS was drafted, it was
considered an important step due to its rules on the delineation
course of the pipelines and distinction of different types of
pipelines with distinct governance regimes.27 ' However, the main
goal of UNCLOS was not the regulation of offshore pipelines.
Therefore, its provisions remain very general. Due to the
increasing number of planned and already constructed offshore
pipelines, the creation of a new international framework that also
accounts for regional needs may be necessary.
2. The Energy CharterTreaty
The Energy Charter Treaty (the "ECT") is an international
treaty established in 1994 to develop international cooperation in
the energy sector, including trade, transit, investments and energy
efficiency.28 0 Article 7 of the ECT is dedicated to transit issues in
which oil and gas pipelines are expressly regarded as means of
energy transport.2 8 1 Although the ECT is an international
agreement that establishes a multilateral framework for cross-

Maki Tanaka, Lessons from the ProtractedMOX Plant Dispute: A Proposed
Protocol on Marine Environmental Impact Assessment to the United Nations Convention
275

on the Law of the Sea, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 356 (2003).
276 Id.

See id.
Id.
279 See generally Ricardo Pereira, The Exploration and Exploitaton of Energy
Resources in International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY LAW 199 (K. Makuch
& R. Pereira eds., 2012) (arguing that UNCLOS gives further control to coastal states).
280 See generally Energy Charter, supra note 199.
281 Id. art. 7(b) (describing "Energy Transport Facilities" as consisting of highpressure gas transmission pipelines, high-voltage electricity transmission grids and lines,
crude oil transmission pipelines, coal slurry pipelines, oil product pipelines, and other
fixed facilities specific for handling energy materials and products).
277
278
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border cooperation in the energy industry, namely pipelines, the
rights and obligations of Member Parties under international law
are not affected.282 Hence, the regulations of the ECT have to be
implemented by its signatory states to the extent that the ECT does
not derogate from other rules of international law or from existing
bilateral or multilateral agreements of the Member States in a
specific pipeline project. 28 3 Additionally, it is worth mentioning
that the main body of the ECT does not regulate the construction
and operation of cross-border pipelines.284
a. Article 19 ECT
Most ECT regulations deal with investment, trade, and transit
issues, (issues that are not a focal point of this paper).
Nonetheless, Article 19 of the ECT embraces the environmental
aspects of energy transportation.2s This article contains the duties
of the Contracting Parties to strive to minimize harmful
environmental impacts occurring within the energy sector, either
within or outside its area.286 Interestingly, this article stresses the
need to act in an economically efficient manner.28 7 In the main

282 Id. ("Nothing in this article shall derogate from a Contracting Party's rights and
obligations under international law including customary international law, existing
bilateral or multilateral agreements, including rules concerning submarine cables and
pipelines.").
283 See id.
284 Richard Happ, The Nord Stream Pipeline: Settlement of Disputes Under the
Energy Charter Treaty?, in GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JAHRBUCH FOR
INTERNATIONALEs RECHT 341, 344 (Universitit Kiel. Institut fMr Internationales Recht
ed., 2009).
285 Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 199, art. 19.
286 Id.

See id.
Art.: (1) In pursuit of sustainable development and taking into account its
obligations under those international agreements concerning the environment
to which it is party, each Contracting Party shall strive to minimize in an
economically efficient manner harmful Environmental Impacts occurring
either within or outside its Area from all operations within the Energy Cycle
in its Area, taking proper account of safety. In doing so each Contracting
Party shall act in a Cost-Effective manner. In its policies and actions each
Contracting Party shall () promote international awareness and information
exchange on Contracting Parties' relevant environmental programmes and
standards and on the implementation of those programmes and standards; (k)
participate, upon request, and within their available resources, in the
development and implementation of appropriate environmental programmes

287
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body of the ECT, only Article 19 provides specific
recommendations
regarding
safety
and
environmental
2
regulations. " As we will discuss later, Article 19 explicitly
expresses leading principles of international environmental law,
such as the polluter pays principle, sustainable development, and
the precautionary principle.28 9 However, not only is Article 19
non-binding,290 but according to Articles 26 and 27 of the ECT,
compulsory dispute settlement under the ECT does not include
pre-investment regulatory obligations.2 91 Hence, this contribution
will mainly examine Article 19 of the ECT. Additionally, the
Secretariat of the Energy Charter Treaty has suggested two model
agreements, which we will discuss and analyze. The discussion of
Article 19 and the proposed model agreements provide useful
insights into cross-border pipeline safety and environmental
regulations considered by the ECT.
in the Contracting Parties. (2) At the request of one or more Contracting
Parties, disputes concerning the application or interpretation of provisions of
this article shall, to the extent that arrangements for the consideration of such
disputes do not exist in other appropriate international fora, be reviewed by
the Charter Conference aiming at a solution. (3) For the purposes of this
Article: (a) "Energy Cycle" means the entire energy chain, including activities
related to prospecting for, exploration, production, conversion, storage,
transport, distribution and consumption of the various forms of energy, and
the treatment and disposal of wastes, as well as the decommissioning,
cessation or closure of these activities, minimizing harmful Environmental
Impacts; (b) "Environmental Impact" means any effect caused by a given
activity on the environment, including human health and safety, flora, fauna,
soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical
structures or the interactions among these factors; it also includes effects on
cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to
those factors; (c) "Improving Energy Efficiency" means acting to maintain the
same unit of output (of a good or service) without reducing the quality or
performance of the output, while reducing the amount of energy required to
produce that output; (d) "Cost-Effective" means to achieve a defined objective
at the lowest cost or to achieve the greatest benefit at a given cost.
Id.
288 Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 200, art. 19.
289 See
id.
290 ROSEMARY LYSTER & ADRIAN BRADBROOK, ENERGY LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT

59 (2006); see generally Waelde, Thomas & Kolo, Environmental Regulation,
Investment Protection and Regulatory Taking in International Law, 50 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. (2001).
291 See Clare Shine, Environmental Protection Under the Energy Treaty Charter, in
THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE

520, 536 (Thomas W. Waelde ed., 1996).
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The primary aim of Article 19 is cost-effective sustainable

development.2 92 To further this purpose, the article recognizes the
precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle as
fundamental rules for the prevention and compensation of
transboundary damage. 293 Article 19 highlights the importance of
market-oriented pricing concerning environmental costs and the
benefits of the energy cycle.294 Further, similar to UNCLOS, the
article recommends cooperation in the field of internationally
compatible environmental standards for the energy sector.295 In
addition, Article 19 emphasizes the promotion of public awareness
and development of transparent assessment at an early stage prior
to decision-making procedures and subsequent monitoring due to
the importance of disclosing information concerning energy-sector
activities and their environmentally adverse impacts.2 96
For a better understanding of Article 19 of the ECT, its
obligations can be summarized as follows: each contracting party
shall (1) strive to minimize in an economically efficient manner
harmful environmental impacts from occurring, (2) take
precautionary measures to prevent or minimize environmental
degradation, (3) co-operate in the field of international
environmental standards, (4) promote public awareness of the
environmental impacts of energy systems, and (5) promote
international awareness and information exchange in contracting
parties' relevant environmental programs and standards and on the
implementation of those programs and standards.2 97
Interestingly, in principle, all the prescribed duties mentioned
under Article 19 are also applicable to cross-border pipelines.9
For a better understanding, they are analyzed case by case. Article
19 suggests the importance of acting in an environmentally sound
and efficient manner as one of its main rules.2
In fact, many
countries mandate the evaluation of harmful impacts of the

292 See Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 199, art. 19.
293 See id.
294

Id.
Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 See generally Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 199, art. 19.
295

299 See id.
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construction and operation of a proposed cross-border pipeline,3 00
and some international and regional instruments regulate it as a
binding duty.3 o' Hence, it can be held that an environmental
impact assessment can be used as one of the instruments for the
evaluation of environmentally adverse impacts prior to the
decision-making, according to Article 19 of the ECT.302
Emphasizing international environmental standards" can be
helpful for the standardization of environmental and safety
regulations applicable to cross-border pipelines. This emphasis
may help to avoid the implementation of double standards over a
pipeline and the associated side-effects of such double
standards.". The promotion of public awareness and participation
in the decision-making process are valuable instruments for
preventing conflicts of interest between operators and local
communities.30 Whenever public information about such projects
and their harmful effects on the environment increases, the
possibility of externalizing the pollution cost to local communities
will decrease.30
b. Model Agreementsfor Cross-BorderPipelines
The Secretariat of the Energy Charter Treaty prepared some
model agreements for facilitating complex cross-border projects.

300 See, e.g., Directive 2011/92, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects
on the Environment, 2011 O.J. (L 26) 11 (2012).
301 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 310.
302 Directive 2011/92, art. 2.; see Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 199, art. 19.
303 International environmental standards are a broad and vague concept that can be
defined in different ways. As S.S. Olson states, there is too much divergence at the
international level to have harmonized environmental standards.
S.S. OLSON,
INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

STANDARDS

Handbook

6,

135

(1999).

If

environmental standards merely constitute a technical code of conduct, it is more
meaningful to refer to internationally compatible standards. This definition refers to
those standards that are mainly applied by states, whether they are produced by
international agencies such as the International Standardization Organization (ISO) or by
national organizations such as the ASTM (American Society of Testing and Material) as
well as by private institutes such as Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Id.
304 See id.
305 D.K. ANTON & D.L. SHELTON,

RIGHTS 312-14 (2011).
306 Id.

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AND HUMAN
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Due to the importance of cross-border pipeline arrangements, two
model agreements have been prepared in relation to oil and gas
cross-border pipelines. These model agreements are referred to as
the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) and the Host
Governmental Agreement (HGA).3 0' The contents of such a model
are not binding for the parties to the ECT.
The IGA is an international treaty under international law.30 s
This model agreement recommends each state establish safety and
environmental standards that are internationally compatible and
acceptable and at least as stringent as the World Bank Group
Environmental, Health, and Safety Standards and Guidelines."*
The recognition of those internationally recommended standards
for cross-border pipelines is an important step towards the
harmonization of environmental and safety regulations."o
However, the World Bank Group standards encompass a wide
range of standards, including those applicable to oil and gas
pipelines."' These standards are more general types of the safety
and environmental regulations.3 12 The standards do not, however,
contain very precise prescriptions concerning the technical
features with which a cross-border pipeline should comply."
Hence, it might be argued that these standards need to be
complemented by other required technical or safety standards.
Moreover, the reference to internationally compatible and
acceptable environmental and safety standards is rather vague and

307
308

See infra Sec. IV (discussing the function of those model agreements).
See Redgwell, supra note 163, at 106.

309 ENERGY

CHARTER

SECRETARIAT,

MODEL

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

GOVERNMENT AGREEMENTS FOR CROSS-BORDER PIPELINES ART. 10

AND HOST

(2007), available at

http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user-upload/document/ma-en.pdf.
310 See id.
311 Environmental, Health,
CORPORATION:

WORLD

BANK

and Safety Guidelines, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
GROUP,
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/554

e8d80488658e4b76af76a65I5bbI 8/Final++General+EHS+Guidelines.pdfMOD=AJPE
RES (last visited Sep. 9, 2014).
312 For instance, in relation to distribution gas pipelines, the standards refer to
international standards for structural integrity and operational performance. See
Environmental Health and Safety Guidelines on Gas Distribution Systems,
INTERNATIONAL

FINANCE

CORPORATION:

WORLD

BANK GROUP (Apr.

30,

2007),

http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9c6e3d0048855ade8754d76a6515bbl 8/Final++Gas+Distribution+Systems.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
313 See id.
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invites different interpretations.3 14
According to a study of a few IGAs, most IGAs do not directly
deal with safety and environmental regulations.' In some cases,
IGAs only refer to general terms or to HGA's. 3 16 Since only
HGA's provide more specific information on environmental and
safety standards, we will now turn to those agreements.
The HGA is a model for an agreement between a host state and
investors."' This model is not considered an international treaty
under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 318 On
the basis of the HGA, the agreed environmental and safety
standards shall be set forth in the Appendix of said agreement.3 19
Theoretically, these standards should be selected based on the
consent of parties.3 20 In practice, these standards are mostly chosen
based on the relative bargaining power of the parties involved.32 1
According to the HGA model, the host government should agree
with the standards that are set forth in the Appendix and should
consent to any action taken by operators. 322
Furthermore,
participating parties of HGAs often give priority to provisions
decreed by an HGA over national or local regulations.32 3
See id.
315 See, e.g., Agreement Among the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Turkey and
the Italian Republic Concerning the Development of the Turkey-Greece-Italy Gas
Transportation Corridor, July 26, 2007.
316 See, e.g., Agreement Among the Azerbaijan Republic, Georgia and the Republic
of Turkey, supra note 130.
314

317 ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 309.

318 If only one party to an agreement is a state and another party or parties are
private actors, the agreement cannot be considered an international treaty. See Redgwell,
supra note 163; see also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J.
Rep. 93 (July 22, 1952).
319 See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 309, art. 16.
320 Id.

321 See infra Sec. IV (discussing the importance of the bargaining power of the
parties involved).
322 ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 309, art. 16.
323 For instance, in the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, according to the host
governmental agreement, safety and environmental regulations decreed in the text of the
agreement were given priority over the local and national environmental and safety
regulations. See Host Government Agreement Between and Among the Government of
Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, BP Exploration
(Azerbaijan) Limited, Totalfinaelf E&P Caucasian Gas SA, Lukagip N.V., Statoil
Azerbaijan a.s., Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Limited, Turkish Petroleum Overseas
Company Limited, Apr. 17, 2002, art. 12 [hereinafter Host Government Agreement
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Those model agreements are categorized within the scope of
soft law instruments and the application of them is non-binding for
Contracting Parties.324 However, since the ECT model agreements
have been implemented in several cross-border pipeline projects
and are going to be applied to new projects by Contracting Parties,
it is interesting to look more closely at this model agreement. We
will do so by selecting one particular case study. It concerns the
safety and environmental regulations contained in the agreement
concerning the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline ("SCP").3 25 The SCP
was constructed according to the terms of the ECT and the
mentioned model agreements.3 26 The SCP transfers natural gas
from Azerbaijan as a producer country, traverses Georgia as a
transit country, to reach the final destination in Turkey as a
consumer country.327 The HGA between Georgia and investors for
the construction and operation of the SCP was concluded in
London in 2002.328

In Article 12 of the SCP HGA, it was clearly mentioned that
applicable environmental and safety standards and practices for the
project shall be set forth in Appendix 4 and shall be applicable,
notwithstanding any conflicting standards and practices otherwise
required by the Georgian law.3 29 According to Appendix 4,
technical and environmental standards are regulated separately.330
Selection, implementation, monitoring, and inspection of those
standards are primarily duties of the operator in charge.'
The
Government of Georgia can determine a representative on its

Between and Among The Government of Georgia and State Oil Company of the
Azerbaijan Republic]; see also id. app. 4.
324 See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 309, introductory note T 30.
325 Host Government Agreement Between and Among The Government of Georgia
and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323.
326 See generally id.
327 See id. art. 12.
328 Id.
329 Id.; see Redgwell, supra note 163, at 106 (stating that standards which are set
forth in the HGA explicitly prevail over any standards applicable according to domestic
law).
330 See Host Government Agreement Between and Among The Government of
Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323, app. 4
(separating technical standards and environmental standards into paragraphs 2 and 3).
331 Id. app. 4 1.1(i).
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behalf.3 3 2 The Government's representative has the right to inspect
the SCP under certain conditions.
The Government
representative shall have the right to observe (by submitting a prior
notice before inspecting) on the condition that he does not interfere
in the application of safety rules.334
Interestingly, in Appendix 4 of the SCP HGA, a large number
of technical standards are mentioned, including technical standards
from the US, the UK, as well as other international technical
standards.3 The operator can select each type of standards, based
on its own discretion.3 In addition, the operator has the right to
use other Western standards in cases where the specified technical
standards are silent or incompatible.
In relation to environmental and safety standards, as was
suggested by the IGA model referred to above, the World Bank
environmental standards should be implemented by Member
Parties as minimum standards.38 In the case of the SCP HGA,
environmental standards should be implemented that are
compatible with such standards that are generally observed by the
international community with respect to comparable natural gas
pipeline projects, but not lower than those applicable in the UK. 339
However, there are a few exceptions mentioned to the application
of those regulations:
(1) Environmental standards other than those which establish a
liability can be implemented;
(2) Those standards should not include the regulatory
administrative structures or procedures;
(3) If those standards are not compatible with the specific
technical standards of this agreement, the SCP participants
shall follow those standards and practices which are

332
333

Id. art. 2

2.2.
Id. app. 4 1.2.

334 Id.
335 See Host Government Agreement Between and Among the Government of
Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323, app. 4
2.1-2.2 (discussing technical standards in several countries).
336 Id. app. 4 $ 2.1 (stating that SCP participants determine the relevant technical
standard).
337 Id.
338 See id. app. 4 $ 3.

339 Id. app. 4 $ 2.2.
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compatible; and
(4) If any authority with jurisdiction over the pipeline enacts
such environmental standards which are in a different form
or more stringent, those standards shall not be subject to

the project.3 40
As described in the above paragraphs, the technical and
environmental regulations that were mentioned in the SCP HGA's
Appendix encompass a wide range of regulations emanating from
different countries in the world.3 4 ' These standards should
basically be selected and enforced by the operator.4 2 Defining and
implementing those standards in the manner proposed by the SCP
HGA has some pros and cons. The advantages can be summarized
as follows:
(1) The operator has better knowledge, thus, he/she can choose
the most appropriate regulations;
(2) The state cannot put pressure on operators by requiring
extra environmental regulations (regulatory taking);3 43 and
(3) Incorporating high quality standards into the agreement
underlines the obligations of parties to protect the
environment.
This can be considered a step ahead compared with many investorstate agreements, which notably narrow the scope of the
application of the domestic law of the host states, but also do not
include any specific environmental commitments.34 4
However, this kind of arrangement also has a few potential
disadvantages or at least ambiguities. For instance, although a
Id. app. 4 2.7.
See infra sec. 4.
342 Host Government Agreement Between and Among the Government of Georgia
and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323, app. 4.
343 As literature and arbitration cases have indicated, environmental regulations of
the host state aiming to intervene in an investment are considered a risk to foreign
investment. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 77-78,
110-11 (Cambridge University Press, 3d ed. 2010) (highlighting foreign investment
issues due to state regulation of human rights and environmental concerns and the clash
between protection of the environment and protection of foreign investment).
344 Some agreements do not expressly set out environmental and safety standards.
Instead they require operators to carry out investment projects in accordance with
technical and safety standards prevailing in the petroleum industry. See, e.g., COTCO
Convention, supra note 132; see generally Lorenzo Cotula, Reconciling Regulatory
Stability and Evolution of Environmental Standards in Investment Contracts: Towards a
Rethink ofStabilization Clauses, J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUSINESS 158, 158-179 (2008).
340
341
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wide range of technical standards was prescribed as permitted
codes, the distinctive features of each of these technical standards
were not taken into account.3 45 Further, although a wide range of
technical standards was listed, it was not clear which of them was
principal or auxiliary. 34 6 Hence, monitoring and inspecting those
standards becomes an impossible task for public authorities. In
addition, environmental standards were not accurately defined in
the text of the agreement.3 47 The agreement only refers to vague
notions such as "other Western standards," or refers to
environmental standards "not lower than those applicable in the
UK."348 As a result, the choice of applicable technical, safety, and
environmental standards is, to some extent, subject to the
discretion of the operator.3 49 Monitoring and inspecting by public
authorities therefore becomes extremely difficult.3"o Moreover, if
environmental and safety standards are not clear, this will also
create difficulties for victims to obtain compensation based on
liability, if they should prove that the operator violated applicable
environmental and safety standards.3 1 This presupposes at least
that there is no ambiguity as far as applicable safety standards are
concerned.
In sum, the ECT model agreements have several functions in
the interaction between the parties, allowing them to create a
cross-border pipeline agreement. The goal of those model
agreements is to elaborate uniform regulations over the entire
length of the pipeline. 352 Furthermore, by referring to the World
Bank regulations as the minimum safety level, those model

345 See generally Richard B. Kuprewicz, General Observations On the Myth of a
Best International Pipeline Standard, ACCUFACTS INC. (March 31, 2007),
http://pstrust.org/docs/beststandard report.pdf (reviewing differences between technical
standards of pipelines).
346 See generally id. (reviewing differences between technical standards of
pipelines).
347 See generally Host Government Agreement Between and Among the
Government of Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note
323.
348 Id. app. 4 f 2.1-2.2.
349 See id. app. 4, Code of Practice.
350 See id.
351 See id.
352 See generally ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 309 (discussing the
model agreements).
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agreements, to some extent, aim at ensuring a minimum quality of
the applicable standards."' The problem, however, is that there is
a large degree of discretion given to the operators in relation to
those standards.
This discretionary power may impede an
effective application of safety standards or it may hinder a proper
inspection by public authorities.5
It is questionable to what
extent the ECT and its associated model agreements can provide
an effective tool for preventing damage resulting from crossborder pipelines.'
3. The Convention on EnvironmentalImpact Assessment
in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991)
a. Working of the Espoo Convention
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (the "Espoo Convention") is a regional
convention under the auspices of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe. 5
Due to the rapid increase of
transboundary environmentally harmful activities, the Espoo
Convention set up obligations of Contracting Parties to assess
environmentally adverse impacts of certain hazardous activities
and to consult affected states prior to decision-making.5
According to Neil Craik, only the Espoo Convention and the
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
formulate detailed requirements for transboundary ElAs.359 Large
diameter oil and gas pipelines are included in the list of the

353 See id. app. 4
3.1 (requiring SCP participants to conform to World Bank
environmental standards).
354 See id. app. 4., Code of Practice.
355 See id.
356 See infra Sec. IV.
357 Espoo, supra note 200, Preamble.
358 Before the adoption of the Espoo Convention, several steps had been taken to
implement transboundary EIAs. These steps were initiated in 1972 with the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm and were followed by the
UNCLOS. See Wiek Scharge, The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in
a Transboundary Context, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TRANSBOUNDARY
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 29, 29-30 (Kees Bastmeijer & Timo Koivurova
eds., 2008).
359 NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

101 (2008).
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hazardous activities in Appendix I of the Espoo Convention.6
Thus, the terms of the Espoo Convention are applicable to crossCross-border pipelines are even
border pipelines as well.
considered complex activities under the Espoo Convention. 61
Strategic environmental assessments are therefore required.
The main aim of the Espoo Convention is to prevent, reduce,
and control adverse transboundary impacts (Article 2).362 For this
purpose, an environmental impact assessment of such activities is
mandated prior to granting permission to execute those
activities."6 For a better understanding, we will briefly introduce
the procedure to be followed in the case of a transboundary
environmental impact assessment according to the Espoo
Convention.

Basically, a state of origin (a contracting party that envisages
to undertake particular activities in its jurisdiction) should submit
required information about possible transboundary impacts to an
affected state (a contracting party likely to be affected by the
transboundary impact of a proposed activity) and to the public in
the area likely to be affected. 65 According to Article 3, a state of
origin must inform an affected state no later than when it informs
its own public. 6 A state of origin shall also provide possibilities
for making comments or objections on the proposed activity by
affected states and their public. 6 In other words, as Koivurova &
Polonen explain, the Espoo Convention requires Contracting
360 U.N. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, supra note 301, app. I 8.
361 Exchange of Good Practices, Large-Scale Transboundary Projects, Application
of the Espoo Convention to Complex Activities, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Economic
Comm'n for Eur., on its 12th mtg. at 3(a), ECE/MP.EIA/WG.1/2009/4 (May 11-13,
2009) [hereinafter UN Economic and Social Council].
362 MARIE-LOUISE LARSSON, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE: LIABILITY AND

REPARATION

140 (1999). Meanwhile, this Convention, and particularly Article 2, does

not pose any duty to prevention of transboundary harm.

CRAIK,

supra note 359, at 103.

363 See id. at 140.

364 See generally Espoo, supra note 200, arts. 1-20 (laying out the procedure to be
followed in case of a transboundary environmental impact assessment).
365 See id. art. 2, if 2, 6.
366 For countries that have no scoping procedures, there will be some problems in
complying with Article 3 of the Espoo Convention because a state of origin may find out
transboundary adverse impacts of proposed activities after its own public participation.
See generally Scharge, supra note 358, at 39-40.
367 See Espoo, supra note 200, art. 2, 5.
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Parties to conduct a national environmental impact assessment that
also includes the observation and participation of the potential
affected foreign actors.36 8
Under the Espoo Convention, an affected party also has an
active role.369 The transboundary EIA will only be continued if an
affected state intends to participate in the transboundary EIA
procedure.3 70
However, when an affected party intends to
participate, it should submit obtainable information relating to the
possible adverse impacts of the proposed activity under its
jurisdiction."' After such exchange of information, and by
gathering the observations of the affected public concerning the
proposed activity, the state of origin shall finally decide about
granting the project or not.372 During the consultation period,
according to Article 5 of the Espoo Convention, the state of origin
can also consider the possible alternatives, including the no-action

option.3 73
Indeed, the Espoo Convention follows the same procedure as
was suggested by UNCLOS and by the ECT for the establishment
of the EIA prior to the decision-making procedure.
The
Convention provides for a transboundary environmental impact
assessment process, which should be undertaken prior to granting
the project, by focusing on the affected states and their local
communities.
To analyze the application of the Espoo
Convention to cross-border pipelines in practice, the EIA of the
368 Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 153.
369 See Espoo, supra note 200, art. 3, i 3-4.
370 Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 153 (stating that the affected state must
confirm its willingness to participate in the transboundary EIA procedure).
371 When there exists disagreement between parties in relation to significant adverse
impacts of non-listed proposed activities, the Convention provides the parties with
general criteria, including size, location, and effects to assist in determining the
environmental significance of non-listed activities. However, the wording of the
Convention, by referring to the fact that parties "may" consider those criteria to
determine environmental adverse impacts of proposed non-listed activities, leaves a gap
for an accurate examination of those criteria. See John Woodliffe, Environmental
Damage and Environmental Impact Assessment, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND VALUATION 133,

140 (Michael Bowman & Alan Boyle eds., 2012).
372 See Espoo, supra note 200, art. 6, 2.
3 See id., art. 5.
374 See generally id. (laying out the transboundary environmental impact assessment
process).
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Nord Stream Gas Pipeline, which was done in accordance with
provisions of the Espoo Convention, is examined as a case study.
b. The EIA in the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline-case
The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline (NSGP) is a 1,220 kilometers
long transmission offshore natural gas pipeline (two parallel
lines).3" This pipeline crosses the exclusive economic zones of
Russia,"' Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, as well as the
territorial waters of Russia, Denmark, and Germany.3 " The NSGP
transfers Russian gas to Germany." Although some debates were
raised in relation to the inclusion of the NSGP under the Espoo
Convention,3 79 the competent authorities of Germany, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, and Russia, as states of origin (since the NSGP
passes through their jurisdictions), unanimously concluded in a
meeting on April 19, 2006, that the NSGP Project falls under
Article 3 of the Espoo Convention.3 o It is noteworthy that the
course of constructing the NSGP primarily falls under UNCLOS.
The reason is that it concerns, as mentioned, an offshore natural
gas pipeline in the exclusive economic zone of the states of origin.
We mentioned above that according to Article 79 of the UNCLOS,
laying such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the
consent of the coastal states.38 ' However, as mentioned before, the
UNCLOS does not explicitly specify the duty to apply an EIA.382
375 Fact Sheet: The Nord Stream Pipeline Project, NORD STREAM (Aug. 2014),
http://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/library/ (follow the "Nord Stream Pipeline
Project" hyperlink).
376 The Russian Federation has signed but not yet ratified the Espoo Convention.
See Convention on Environunental Impact Assessment in a TransboundatyContext, U.N.
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
TREATY
CONVENTION,

&mtdsgno=XXVII-4&chaptei-27&lang-en (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). But with
regard to the Nord Stream Project, Russia is acting as a Party of Origin to the extent
possible under its legislation. See BENDIK SOLuM WHIST, NORD STREAM: NOT JUST A

PIPELINE 7 (Fridtjof Nansen Inst. 2008). Hence, for the purpose of this article the term
"Parties of Origin" as used herein shall include the Russian Federation.
7 See Fact Sheet: The Nord Stream PipelineProject, supra note 375.
378 Id.
379 Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 158.
380 Espoo Report Chapter 3: Legal Framework and Public Consultation, NORD
STREAM 62 (Feb. 2009), https://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/library/?pk=73 (follow
the "Espoo Report Chapter 3: Legal Framework and Public Consultation" hyperlink).
381 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 79.
382 Id.
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Its references to determining environmental impacts... are rather
vague and unclear and, at a minimum, do not include an explicit
obligation to conduct a transboundary EIA.38 4
To obtain the permission from the mentioned states, the Nord
Stream Company, as an operator, was involved in extensive
consultations with each of the countries concerned (as states of
origin), to be certain that the NSGP fully complied with the
respective national legislation."' In addition to those five nations,
the NSGP may affect Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland as
affected states; however, no segment of the NSGP falls under their
jurisdiction.8 Therefore, these four states, as affected states, were
also part of the consultation process. 8
In conformity to the
provisions of the Espoo Convention, each of the states of origin as
well as the Russian Federation opened its EIA procedure to all the
states of origin and affected states." The involvement of that
many states and parties of course increased the level of complexity
of the EIA of the project.38
Various types of documents both at the national as well as at
the international level were prepared by the Nord Stream
Company and translated into all affected nations' languages in
view of the public participation.39 The public in the origin and
affected states, including governmental authorities and nongovernmental actors, provided documents and sent comments
concerning the EIA of the project.3 9' Eventually, the final EIA
report was prepared and submitted to the states of origin to obtain
their permission.39 2 All permits to begin construction were
received by February 2010 from the states of origin.3 93

Id. art. 194.
See Alexander Lott, Marine Environmental Protection and Transboundary
Pipeline Projects: A Case Study of the Nord Stream Pipeline, 27 MERKOURIOS-UTRECHT
J. INT'L & EUR. L. 55, 61 (2011).
385 Id. at 62.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 See Lott, supra note 384, at 62.
391 See id. at 60.
392 See id. at 62.
393 See id. at 68.
383

384
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The EIA of the NSGP has been considered by many authors as
a model way of how a transboundary EIA may be applied under
the Espoo Convention.3 94 However, there are also a few critical
points concerning the transboundary EIA procedure in the NSGP.
One of the main criticisms related to the fact that the EIA report
inadequately examined alternative routes of the NSGP. 9 ' This
was an issue for one of the states of origin (Finland), one of the
affected states (Estonia); the European Parliament; and, finally, for
the Espoo Secretariat.396
Originally, Finland, as a state of origin, after receiving the
second EIA report, notified the Nord Stream Company about its
concerns in relation to the lack of studying the alternative routes of
the NSGP near the Russian island of Gogland and the route in the
South of the Gulf of Finland (Estonian Section)."' But the Nord
Stream Company informed Finland that after consultation with the
Russian authorities, the Company did not intend to investigate a
possible alternative route in the territorial waters of Russia."'
Since Russia is not a member of the Espoo Convention, it could
easily decline permitting a feasibility study in its own territorial
waters.3 99 Moreover, the Espoo Convention articulates that an
alternative route could only be examined in the jurisdiction of the
states of origin (Article 5).400 In addition, the request of the
Company to conduct seabed studies in Estonia's Exclusive
Economic Zone was rejected by the Estonian authorities. 40' The
legal basis of that rejection by Estonia could, to some extent, be
considered questionable under UNCLOS.40 2
The second contentious issue was raised by the European
Parliament in publishing the European Parliament Resolution on

394

See Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131; see also Vinogradov, supra note 34,

at 248.
See Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 169.
Id.; see also UN Economic and Social Council, supra note 361.
397 See Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 169.
398 The NSGP Environmental Impact Assessment Report, NORD STREAM,
http://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/library/?q=environmental+impact+
assessment+report&category=&type=&page=6&country= (last visited July 16, 2013).
399 See id.
400 See Espoo, supra note 200, art. 5.
401 See Lott, supra note 384, at 61.
402 Vinogradov, supra note 34, at 261.
395

396
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the Environmental Impact of the Planned Gas Pipeline in the
Baltic Sea to Link Up Russia and Germany. 403 This resolution
reflects environmental concerns in relation to the construction and
operation of the NSGP by emphasizing the inadequacy of the
environmental impact assessment.4' Those concerns contained a
wide range of environmental and strategic issues. 40 s The European
Parliament resolution inter alia referred to a lack of adequate
descriptions of the environmental conditions in the Baltic Sea, a
lack of a precise examination of the agricultural and industrial
emissions polluting the Baltic Sea, the need to evaluate them in
proportion with the possible environmental threats caused by the
NSGP, and the lack of attention to the potential threats to the
security of the NSGP and possible alternative routes (not limited
to the states of origin and, including onshore routes).40 6
As mentioned, according to the Espoo Convention Protocol,
the cross-border pipelines are listed as a complex large-scale
project. 407 This Protocol mandates that parties run a strategic
environmental assessment for complex activities.40 8
The
Secretariat of the Espoo Convention underlined the strategic
dimension of cross-border pipelines and the necessity of
conducting a strategic environmental assessment for the NSGP.409
However, as Koivurova & Polonen correctly state, focusing on the
duty of states of origin to conduct the SEA, the Member Parties of
the Espoo Convention cannot mandate that a company conduct a
strategic environmental assessment.4
Hence, it is in principle a
duty of the states of origin to conduct the SEA by themselves. 411
Generally, the Espoo Convention is considered to be one of the
more progressive regional environmental instruments aimed at the
403

Resolution on the Environmental Impact of the Planned Gas Pipeline in the

Baltic Sea to Link Up Russia and Germany, EUR. PARL. Doc. 11 10, 17, 20, 22, 24, 25,

25, 33 (0614/2007 and 0952/2007) (2008) [hereinafter European Parliament].
404 Id.
405 Id.
406 Id.
407 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, U.N. Econ. Comm'n for
Eur. Annex 1, U.N. Doc. ECEIMP.EIA/2003/2 (May 21, 2003).
408 Id. art. 4.
409 See UN Economic and Social Council, supranote 361.
410 See Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 179.
411 See id.
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prevention of transboundary environmental impacts, which is also
applicable to cross-border pipelines.4 12 The EIA of the NSGP was
conducted in an innovative manner as a large-scale project which
came under the application of the Espoo Convention.413 However,
notwithstanding the fact that conducting an EIA with respect to
this NSGP project is certainly to be considered a positive, a variety
of comments can still be made.
First, the case of the NSGP project shows that the Espoo
Convention can only be correctly implemented in practice if all
states concerned, including the states of origin and the affected
states, are members to the Espoo Convention. Otherwise a proper
application of the EIA to proposed cross-border pipelines may not
be achieved. For instance, in the case of the NSGP project, the
affected states were members of the Espoo Convention and hence
participated in the EIA process, but not in the final decisionmaking process with respect to the NSGP.4 14 Some of the affected
states seriously criticized the effectiveness of the EIA on the
project.4 15 In this particular case the main problem was obviously
the fact that a decision on the pipeline was finally made in Russia,
which is not a member to the Espoo Convention.4 16 As a result, in
those cases where some states (or even just one state) are not
members to the Convention, the states may externalize pollution
costs to other states concerned and vice versa.
Second, according to Article 5 of the Espoo Convention,
possible alternative routes for the proposed projects can only be
suggested in states of origins' territories.417 As the cases of

412 Mari Koyano, The Significance of the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) in International
EnvironmentalLaw: Examining the Implications of the Danube Delta Case, 26 J. INT'L.
Ass'N. FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT 299, 299 (2008).
413 See Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 180; see also Lott, supra note 384,
at 62.
414 See The NSGP Environmental Inpact Assessment Report, supra note 398.
415 Nord Stream Baltic Sea Pipeline Assessments Breach EU Laws, Estonian
Environmental Groups Alert European Commission, ESTONIAN FUND FOR NATURE,
http://www.elfond.ee/en/news/896-nord-stream-baltic-sea-pipeline-assessements-breacheu-laws-estonian-environmental-groups-alert-european-commission (last visited July 16,
2013); Nord Stream Faces More Obstacles, NEwEUROPE ONLINE (May 5, 2009),
http://www.neurope.eu/article/nord-stream-faces-more-obstacles.
416 See The NSGP Environmental knpact Assessment Report, supra note 398.
417 Espoo, supra note 200, art. 5.
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Estonia and Russia, as affected state and non-member state,
indicated, an alternative route for the affected parties may be more
environmentally sound than in the state of origin.
Moreover,
according to the EU Parliament, all possible alternative routes for
the construction of such pipelines, in particular the terrestrial
route, should be taken into consideration by the decisionmakers.4 19
Third, one commentator suggested the elaboration of joint EIA
The joint EIA, as Francisco M. Hernndez
procedures. 42 0
suggests, can improve public participation and avoid conflicts in
integrating different EIAs for the specific project. 421
This
observation can be applicable if all the states concerned agree with
the establishment of a joint EIA, instead of applying their national
regulations separately. 42 2 Otherwise, as was the case in the NSGP,
each state will evaluate the EIA reports only based on their own
national regulations.4 23
Fourth, in accordance with Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Espoo
Convention, the EIA report should be published by the state of
origin.424 This provides an appropriate opportunity for the affected
state governments, as well as for local communities and NGOs, to
make comments on the proposed project.42 5 The state of origin
that finally decides to grant the proposed project should take into
consideration commented observations during the decision-making
procedures.426 However, the only mechanism adopted by the
Espoo Convention to ensure the contribution of the commented
observations in an appropriate manner is to afford legal recourse
only for the affected states, and not for the local communities to
challenge the final EIA report. 427 As a matter of fact, some authors

See Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 169.
419 See European Parliament, supra note 403.
420 See Francisco M. Hernandez, Analysis of the Espoo Convention as Applied to
Mega Projects: The Case of Nord Stream 37 (May 2008) (unpublished Master of Science
thesis, Lunds Universitet) (on file with author).
418

421 See id.
422 Id.

423 See The NSGP Environmental Impact Assessment Report, supra note 398.
424 See European Parliament, supra note 403, arts. 3-5.
425 See id.

426 See Espoo, supra note 200, art. 6.
427 See id. art. 15.
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also dispute the quality of the EIA under the Espoo Convention in
the case of the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline. 428 These concerns were
mostly aimed at the reliability of the gathered data.4 29
Nevertheless, no legal mechanism is suggested for dealing with
those issues under the Espoo Convention.430
Of course we do realize that those observations may sound
slightly naive. In practice, cross-border pipeline projects represent
large economic and thus, unavoidably, political interests. Those
interests may often outweigh the pure environmental interests that
are at stake in such a project as well.
IV. Evaluation of Safety and Environmental Regulation of
Cross-Border Pipelines
As indicated in previous sections, cross-border oil and gas
pipelines have been hypothesized to pose a range of potential
damage. This damage can be classified as transboundary damage.
Accordingly, given the legal frameworks applicable to crossborder pipelines described in section II, a wide range of
regulations can be applicable to those pipelines, at least in
principle. 431 The question that arises is how effective those
regulations are for the prevention of transboundary and
transnational damage? To answer this question, this section tries
to analyze the effectiveness of the mentioned regulations to
prevent such damage. In this respect, we will not examine detailed
technical standards (also because they are often laid in agreements
between parties which remain confidential). However, based on
the construction of the regulatory framework as sketched in
section III, we will formulate a few sources of concern regarding
the effectiveness of this regulatory framework as far as its ability
to adequately prevent environmental harm and promote safety is
concerned.43 2
One of the aims of the environmental conventions discussed in
section III is to minimize environmental pollution (in particular
See Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 173.
429 Nord Stream Assessment Seriously UnderestimatesEnvironmental Consequences
of the Baltic Sea, WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE (May 7, 2009),
http://wwf.panda.org/?uNewslD= 163682.
430 See generally Espoo, supra note 200 (suggesting no legal mechanism).
431 See supra Sec. II.
432 See supra Sec. III.
428
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transboundary pollution). 43 3 As a result, in the first subsection of
this section, the effectiveness of those conventions for the
prevention of transboundary pollution in the case of cross-border
pipelines is considered by using a few examples.
In applying the unified model, safety and environmental
standards are mainly chosen by an operator in charge.
The
operators in charge should enforce these regulations, which can be
derived from international standards, private standards (tradeassociation standards and self-regulations), or even national
standards of other states.435 In fact, the public authorities of host
states are only entitled to monitor this process in a narrow scope.436
To an important extent this amounts to self-regulation43 or, as it is
sometimes referred to, private environmental governance. 4 38 The
question arises whether this application of private standards, or at
least standards that a private MNC chooses to comply with,
adequately incorporates the potential externalities created by
cross-border pipelines. In other words, as Kandiyoti argues, given
two distinctive modes of operation of the same companies in
different countries, there are some concerns in relation to
protecting the environment by multinational corporations. 439 The
second subsection will analyze the potential problems that may
result from such a model.
A. TransboundaryDamage
As we already argued, the transportation of oil and gas via
cross-border pipelines may result in transboundary damage.440
Usually this transboundary damage will take the form of

433 See id.
434 See infra Subsec. B.

435 See id.
436 See id.
437 See generally Roger Van den Bergh, Towards Efficient Self-Regulation in
Markets for ProfessionalServices, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2004, THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION AND THE LIBERAL PROFESSION (Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2006).
438 See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance,
(Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 13-10, 2013), available at http://ssm.com/
abstractID=2237515.
439 Kandiyoti, supra note 45, at 38.
440 See supra Sec. IV.
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environmental pollution.44 '
The economic basis for this
transboundary damage is that polluters externalize harm to others
(in this case across-the-border), thus not internalizing pollution
costs.442
In a typical transboundary pollution case, a state of origin
might decline to exercise more stringent regulations on the local
industry when benefits would be obtained by other states."3
Additionally, an affected state often suffers from a lack of
information about the adverse impacts of such activities. 4 Even
with this information, affected states may have some obstacles for
the establishment of litigation against polluters and eventually for
the enforcement of the decision in the source state.445 As a
consequence, a state of origin uses the benefits of the polluting
activity and externalizes pollution costs to an affected state. 4 46 The
affected state bears the costs of pollution but does not enjoy the
benefits of such activities in most cases.447
In the literature, as well as at the policy level, various
instruments have been suggested to deal with the problem of
transboundary pollution. 448 The goal of those instruments is to
force polluters in the source state to internalize the externality

441 Id.
442 See John Warren Kindt, International Environmental Law and Policy: An
Overview of TransboundaryPollution, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 583, 591-92 (1986).
443 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE
L.J. 931 (1997).
444 RENt LEFEBER,

TRANSBOUNDARY

ENVIRONMENTAL

INTERFERENCE

AND THE

ORIGIN OF STATE LIABILITY 32 (1996).

445 See id.
446 See id.
See id.
448 For instance, the OECD Council Recommendations on Principles Concerning
Transfrontier Pollution, adopted in 1974: After tipping its hat in the direction of the
Stockholm Declaration, "the Council urged that transboundary pollution disputes are
resolved on the basis of what is called a "principle of non-discrimination." Under this
principle, the source states should agree to control transboundary pollution to levels
considered acceptable in comparable circumstances in the source state itself, and should
agree to afford the same rights in judicial and administrative proceedings to persons in an
affected state as to persons in the source state. See Recommendation of the Council on
Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, 14 November 1974, Organization for
Economic
Co-Operation
and
Development,
C
(74)224,
available at
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowlnstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentlD= 12.
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caused through their polluting activities.449 For the purposes of
this study it is important to stress that transboundary pollution can
of course result from both onshore and offshore pipelines.450 In
fact, as we identified above, only a few international and regional
conventions deal with the prevention of transboundary pollution
resulting from cross-border pipelines, namely UNCLOS and the
ESPOO Convention.45 1
1. TransboundaryPollution Under UNCLOS and the
Espoo Convention
We showed that questions could be asked regarding the
effectiveness of UNCLOS as an instrument to prevent
transboundary pollution. According to Article 194 of UNCLOS,
in order to prevent transboundary pollution of the marine
environment, states should ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction do not cause damage to other states and to their
environment.45 2 In Article 195, transboundary pollution, which
might result from pipeline accidents, is identified and, as a
consequence, states are obliged to prevent such transboundary
pollution. 4 53 However, as the text of these two articles shows, the
extent to which transboundary pollution will be prevented by
effective legal instruments is in fact left to the discretionary power
of the polluter states.454 These states, nonetheless, have obligations
pursuant to Articles 194 and 195, which are further developed by
Articles 207 and 213.45
Article 213 holds that states shall take other measures
necessary to implement applicable international rules and
standards
established
through
competent
international
organizations or diplomatic conferences to prevent, reduce, and
control pollution of the marine environment from land-based
sources. 45 6 This article establishes a duty for states to regulate
449 See id.
450
451
452

See supra Section IV.
See supra Section III.
See UNCLOS, supra note 198.

455

Id.
Id.
Id.

456

As mentioned, these provisions mostly fall under the domain of soft law. See

453
454
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transboundary pollution. However, as Alan E. Boyle correctly
argues, UNCLOS does not determine the content and extent of
laws and regulations to be adopted by states.45 7 In addition,
international rules and standards are vague concepts and should be
clarified precisely.4 58 International standards encompass various
types of standards of different dimensions and levels.459
Under UNCLOS, if a state is the owner of a pipeline, the state
should comply with internationally compatible standards in order
to prevent marine pollution.4 60 If the owner of the pipeline is a
multinational corporation or if the pipeline is a transit one, which
needs to obtain an authorization of host states,46 1 the authorizing
states shall apply such regulations as compatible with the
international standards for the prevention of marine pollution.
However, in some cases, an adjacent state may have a different
level of regulations, particularly with regard to the threshold for
marine environmental pollution.46 2 Consequently, the problem
may arise that double standards are applied with respect to the
same environmental component. 463 Further, as Boyle notes, the
"States' obligation is only to 'take account of internationally
agreed rules and standards, but not necessarily to adopt them." 4 64
Thus, in practice, states still retain wide discretion in the way they
KLEIN, supra note 274, at 150-52.

457 Alan E. Boyle, Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 AM.
J. INT'L L. 347, 347 (1985).
458 E.G. HINKELMAN, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 572 (8th ed. 2008); G.
MORGAN & R. WHITLEY, CAPITALISMS AND CAPITALISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

168 (2012).
459 Id.

460 Boyle (1985) argues that compatible standards may refer to international
conventions already established at the time, aiming at the control of vessel pollution.
International conventions include: International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (London Convention), Adopted on 12 May 1954, and entered
into force on 26 July 1958; and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Adopted on 1973 (Convention), 1978 (1978 Protocol),
1997 (Protocol - Annex VI); entered into force on 2 Oct. 1983 (Annexes I and II). See
Boyle, supra note 457, at 352. Problems still remain since, not one international
convention has established safety standards with respect to cross-border pipelines.
461 UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 79.
462 D.
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regulate pollution.
According to Articles 207 and 208 of the UNCLOS, states
shall endeavor to harmonize their policies for the prevention of
marine pollution at the appropriate regional level.4 65 Putting an
emphasis on the importance of harmonizing standards, particularly
by focusing on regional characteristics may be an effective means
for meeting a developing country's needs. It is a valuable
approach in order to avoid implementing double standards for
regulating transboundary pollution. Nevertheless, in examining
states' practice, most of these regional agreements in relation to
the protection of the marine environment do not specifically
establish such standards and rules. 66 It can be held that to an
important extent this obligation to strive for the harmonization of
policies with respect to the prevention of marine pollution has
remained an empty shell.46 7
As a corollary, it can be argued that under the terms of
UNCLOS, states are obliged to prevent transboundary pollution,
which might also result from cross-border pipelines. However,
they can apparently do so at their own discretion. This may lead to
the implementation of double standards in a marine body by
coastal states. In addition, under UNCLOS states are not obliged
to inform affected states about adverse impacts of hazardous
projects. 468 Therefore, the possibility of transboundary pollution
resulting from cross-border pipelines remains under UNCLOS. 469
2. The Example of the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline
As we mentioned, there is no adequate published data
concerning the damage that results from cross-border pipelines.

UNCLOS, supra note 198, arts. 207-08.
466 For instance, according to Article 18 of the Framework Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea (Tehran Convention, 2003),
Contracting Parties are obliged only to cooperate in formulating standards. However, no
standards have been established so far. See Framework Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, Nov. 4, 2003, 44 ILM 1 (2005).
467 Of course one may hold that "the OSPAR Convention is an example" of the
cooperation for establishing regional standards. See Rainer Lagoni, Regional Protection
of the Marine Environment in the Northeast Atlantic Under the OSPAR Convention of
465

1992, in THE STOCKHOLM DECLARATION AND LAW OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 183,

198 (Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore & Said Mahmoudi eds., 2003).
468 See UNCLOS, supra note 198.
469 Id.

N.C. J. INT'L L. &COM. REG.

120

Vol. XL

However, just to illustrate the problem, we can refer to the Blue
Stream Gas Pipeline (BSGP), which is a cross-border pipeline that
falls under the scope of UNCLOS. 47 0 The BSGP is designed for
the export of up to 16.0 billion cubic meters of gas each year.47'
This 1,250 km long gas pipeline traverses a 373 km onshore
section (Russian Federation), a 398 km offshore section across the
Black Sea (Russian territorial water and continental shelf plus
Turkish continental shelf and territorial water), and a 444 km
onshore section from Samsun to Ankara (Turkey).4 72 The segment
of the international water is 340 km long or 87% of the entire
marine segment.473
The Black Sea is one of the semi-closed marine bodies, only
connected with the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosphorus
Strait.4 74 Due to its particular ecological circumstances, many
studies claim that the Black Sea is in critical condition and
highlights the threats that might exacerbate the sensitiveness of
this area. 4 " The BSGP has two distinctive sections: one that falls
under the law of the coastal states and a second that is subject to
international law.47 6 In the onshore sections and territorial waters
of Russia and Turkey, the BSGP was constructed under the
jurisdiction of Russian and Turkish laws.4 77 The BSGP's section
that is located on the continental shelves of Russia and Turkey is
subject to UNCLOS.4 " Thus, UNCLOS can be applied to the
international part of the pipeline.479
It is important to mention that neither the Russian Federationso
470 See Nikolai Grishin, Environmental Impact Assessment of a Transboundary
Pipeline in the Black Sea Region (Legal and Environmental Aspects), Ecoterra
Environmental Assessment Agency, ECE/ENHS/NONE/2005/8 10 (2005).

471 Id.

See id.
Id.
474 Id.
475 Id.
476 See Laurence P. Mee, The Black Sea in Crisis: A Need for Concerted
International Action, 21 J. HUM. ENv'T 27 (1992); see also J.W. Redman et. al.,
Petroleum and PAH Contamination of the Black Sea, in 44 Marine Pollution Bulletin 48
(2002).
477 See Mee, supra note 476, at 27; see also Readman et al., supra note 476, at 48.
478 See Mee, supra note 476, at 27; see also Readman et al., supra note 476, at 48.
479 See Grishin, supra note 472.
480 Id.
472
473
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nor Turkey is a member to the Espoo Convention. Hence, neither

Turkey nor Russia is obliged to conduct a transboundary EIA.4 8 1
However, an EIA for the pipeline concerned was conducted by the
pipeline's operator according to Russian national law.482 This EIA
has also been performed in accordance with Article 123 of
UNCLOS. 48 3 Of course, UNCLOS does not contain any obligation
to conduct a transboundary EIA.484
The EIA for this particular project has been undertaken by the
operator. 4 85
This was Gazprom, a Russian stated-owned
company. 486 According to the EIA Report, the impacts of the
pipeline on the ambient air and water (gas leakage and corrosion)
should be negligible in most conditions and would only be
significant in a few conditions.4 87 It is not clear whether the
affected states have been informed about the results of the EIA or
not.488
On the other hand, an independent report, which was submitted

by an NGO 489 had some critical observations concerning the EIA
of the BSGP.
This report examined the technical and
environmental impacts of the construction and operation of the
BSGP. 490 According to the mentioned report, owing to the depth
481

Id.
Id.
483 Article 123 of UNCLOS stipulates that States bordering an enclosed or semienclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the
performance of their duties with regard to the protection and conservation of the marine
environment. See UNCLOS, supra note 198, art. 123.
484 See generally id. (providing that non-members do not have an obligation to
conduct a transboundary EIA).
485 See Grishin,supra note 470.
486 See id.
487 The habitat and livelihoods of coastal populations could be affected by a pipeline
accident, due to, for example, a rupture near the coast or a rupture caused by a landslide.
The theoretical predictions in the feasibility study allow for the possibility of fire and
explosive hazards. On the submarine section of the pipeline, losses to the fishing
industry are put at US $ 29,800 during the construction phase (at 1996 prices) and US $
259,500 a year during operation. Payment for atmospheric pollution during the
construction phase was put at 503,200 rubles (at 1996 prices) and for a possible
accidental discharge of methane, at 7.28 million rubles. Id.
488 See id.
489 See Antonio Tricarico, Oil in the Caspian, ECA WATCH (Sep. 2001), availableat
http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/oilgas mining/caspoil/bluestream.html.
490 Id.
482
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and ecological circumstances of the Black Sea, any leakage
resulting from the BSGP may contaminate water deeper than 100
to 200 meters. 4 9 ' The geological characteristics of the Black Sea
seabed might be sufficient for the destruction of the pipeline.492
This could be caused by earthquakes or by other reasons. 493 Gas
breakthrough from the pipeline will lead to emissions of high
amounts of compressed gas into the water mass and then into the
atmosphere, which could endanger the water and sediments.49 4
These threats might affect the Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish, and
Georgian coasts.4 95 Finally, the report asserts the inadequacy of
the EIA, which was conducted by the beneficiary operator and
under its own regulations.4 96
3. Lessons Learned
A lesson that can be learned from the BSGP project, regardless
of verifying the authenticity of those reports, is that UNCLOS is
not able to deal adequately with these types of projects.497 Since
the states of origin do not have any express obligation or
responsibility to consult with affected states about the
environmental impacts of such projects, they may undermine the
environmental interests of the affected states. 498 This issue may
appear in two forms: first, the states of origin might underestimate
transboundary risks of such activities; second, even when they do
recognize the potential transboundary risks of such activities, they
are not obliged to consult the affected states under UNCLOS.4 99
Of course the Espoo Convention would apply to this
situation.o On paper the impact from transboundary pollution
resulting from a cross-border pipeline could be reduced as a result
of the transboundary EIA.so' This is due to the fact that the Espoo

491

Id.

492

495

See id.
See id.
Tricarico, supra note 489.
See id.

496

Id.

497
498

See supra Sec. IV, Subsec. 2.
See id. Subsection 1.

499

Id.

500

See generally Espoo, supra note 200.
See id. arts. 2.

493
494

501

2014

CROSS-BORDER PIPELINE SAFETY

123

Convention forces states of origin to notify and consult with
affected states prior to making a decision concerning the
construction of a cross-border pipeline.502
Unfortunately, in
assessing the effectiveness of the Espoo Convention, there are
doubts regarding its ability to achieve the aim of preventing
transboundary pollution.
First, it should be mentioned that applying the Espoo
Convention only works well in practice when all littoral states of a
marine body participate in the EIA procedures. Otherwise, similar
to the NSGP's EIA, which is discussed in Section II, such an
incomplete EIA opens the door for transboundary pollution.so3
Second, according to the provisions of the Espoo Convention,
alternative routes for the construction of a cross-border pipeline
can be suggested only within the territory of a state of origin; the
Espoo Convention does not require considering alternative routes
beyond the state of origin's territory, even if those alternative
routes would be more environmentally sound.son
Third, the Espoo Convention does not oblige the state of origin
to stop the proposed activity on the basis of adverse transboundary
environmental impacts."os The Espoo Convention only forces a
state of origin to take into consideration adverse transboundary
impacts within its decision-making procedures; therefore, the
Espoo Convention, to a large extent, reflects the domestic EIA
laws of the state of origin.506 As a result, the Espoo Convention
enables the public of the affected party to have access to the
domestic EIA procedures to the same extent as local residents of
the state of origin.'
Thus, the substantive effectiveness of the
transboundary EIA is highly dependent upon the effectiveness of
the domestic EIA. 08
See id. arts. 2-3.
503 See supra Sec. II.
504 For example, although in a feasibility study south of Gogland Island (the Russian
territory) was suggested by Finland as a better route, the developer in the Nord Stream
Gas Pipeline's EIA procedure did not accept that Russia did not grant such permission.
Koivurova & Polonen, supra note 131, at 169.
505 See Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural Obligations in International Environmental
Agreements, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 275, 288 (1997).
506 John H. Knox, The Myth And Reality Of Transboundary Environmental Impact
Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 291 (2002).
507 See id.
508 See id.
502
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Since other international instruments are lacking, a state of
origin can still externalize pollution costs to affected states.so' Of
course, one could hold that a state of origin could equally be
affected by the adverse impact from the cross-border pipeline.
Hence, it will undoubtedly also have some incentives to attend to
the safety of the cross-border pipeline. However, the problem is
that the state of origin enjoys the benefits of the project and may
hence be more inclined to regard those benefits and disregard the
ensuing environmental harm. For the affected states, the problem
is not only that they suffer from transboundary environmental
pollution, but also that they do not enjoy the same benefits from
the project.s"o
B. Applicable Standards to TransboundaryPipelines
Cross-border oil and gas pipelines are multi-billion dollar
projects that require a high amount of investment, technological
knowledge, and equipment."' Thus, the proposed pipelines are
often attained by cooperation of MNCs. 512 As noted, applying
environmental regulations to cross-border pipelines is strongly
related to the legal framework that governs the project.5 " In
considering the unified model agreements, which are regulated
under the ECT, an operator should apply a uniform set of
regulations containing technical, safety, and environmental
standards to the entire length of a pipeline.5 14 The operating
companies of such pipelines are mainly joint ventures5s5 or
international consortiums 16 that are constituted by the
participation of MNCs and state-owned companies.
The
applicable regulations-which can be self-regulations, trade
association codes, or even national standards of the other
509
510

See Infra Sec. 3, Subsec. b.
See id.

511 See Infra Sec. I [Introduction].
512 See id.
513 See id.
514 See Infra Sec. 2 [The Energy Charter Treaty]; see Infra Section 1, Subsection b
[the Unified Model].
515 See, e.g., THE WEST AFRICAN GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, http://www.wagpco.com
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=78&lang-en (last visited
July 22, 2013).
516 See,

e.g.,

Company

Profile, NORD

STREAM

GAS

http://www.nord-stream.com/about-us/ (last visited July 22, 2013).

PIPELINE

COMPANY,
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states 5 17- are usually selected by an operator and written in the
respective agreement. In addition, in some cases, even the EIA of
a proposed pipeline, which is conducted by independent
international consulting firms, might not be subject to the
affirmation of a host state.s"s
Considering the unified model of cross-border pipelines, in
which the entire length of a pipeline is operated uniformly in
different states, applying uniform standards to the entire pipeline
seems reasonable.5 19 It is presumed that the operator in charge has
better information on optimal safety standards.52 0 Hence, applying
a desired set of standards suggested by the operator can ensure the
stable running of the project.5 2 1 This set of regulations should
finally be confirmed by host states as a set of uniform standards
through relevant agreements.52 2 According to the ECT, the
technical and environmental regulations, which should be agreed
to by all participants and described in the annex, should be
internationally compatible and acceptable standards that are at
least as stringent as the World Bank Group. 5 23 Nevertheless, a
question arises regarding what the specific relationship is between
the standards laid down in the agreement and the domestic
regulations of the host states.
The answer to this question depends upon the status of the
applicable regulations in the unified regime. Generally, the
applicable law to cross-border pipelines in the unified model can
be divided into two categories: (1) an operator is required to
comply with the domestic regulations of a host state, and (2) an
MNC involved in the project is excluded from complying with
environmental and safety regulations of a host state by establishing
517 In the case of South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, American and British national
standards and trade associations' standards have been agreed upon as technical and
environmental standards. See Host Governmental Agreement Between and Among the
Government of Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note
323, app. 4.
518 See id.
519 See supra Sec. 1, Subsec. b [the Unified Model].

520 See id.

521 See generally Mark B. Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the
Fox Guard the Henhouse?, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 399 (1993) (providing
arguments in favor of applying private codes of conduct by MNCs).
522 See id.

523 See Energy Charter, supra note 199, at 22.
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a contractual clause in the host governmental agreement.524
The first possibility is, therefore, that the operator has to
comply with the host states' safety and environmental
regulations.125 To the extent that those domestic regulations are
effective, they could give the operator incentives to internalize
pollution costs. 2 6 In that case, the host state should also monitor
the pipeline. 5 27 Effectively, this would mean that the same
regulations apply to both domestic projects and a cross-border
pipeline. One example is the new Swiss section of the North SeaItaly Pipeline (Transitgas pipeline) that was commissioned in
2003.528 In that case, the federal environmental protection law of
Switzerland, as a transit state, was applied to the pipeline.529
Therefore, before the construction of a pipeline, a risk assessment
was conducted based on the safety regulations of the transit
country, Switzerland. 3 ' As a result, the route for the unacceptable
zone was changed into a tunnel and for intermediate zones,
preventive measures, such as increasing the pipeline depth of
cover and concrete slab, and covering and increasing pipeline
thickness, were applied in order to minimize the risks of an
accident and of pollution."' The aforementioned mechanism can
be enforced effectively when a host state has the capacity to

524 See, e.g., The Pipeline System, TRANSITGAS AG., http://www.transitgas.
org/EN/pipeline.aspx (last visited September 12, 2013) (illustrating an example of
operators acting in compliance with domestic regulations of the host state); see, e.g.,
Host Governmental Agreement Between and Among the Government of Georgia and
State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323 (showing an example of a
host governmental agreement).
525 See The Pipeline System, supra note 524.
526 See id.
527 See id.
528 In 1974 the 164-kilometer Transitgas Pipeline, the Swiss section of the North
Sea-Italy pipeline, was officially put into service. In 1997, due to the increasing demand
for natural gas in Italy, the Italian natural gas company SNAM SpA decided to expand
the complete transport system. This new section was commissioned in 2003 and
includes 185 kilometer of thirty-six inch and forty-eight inch pipelines. At present, the
Transitgas Pipeline system consists of 292 kilometers from two parallel lines, which
cross Switzerland from north to south. See generally The Pipeline System, supra note
524.
529 Id.
530 Id.
531 Christian Pliss, Gunthard Niederbiumer and Rolf Siagesser, Risk Assessment of

the TransitgasPipeline,45 PIPES & PIPELINES INT'L 33 (2000).
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adequately regulate the suggested pipelines and monitor
enforcement of those regulations, which is likely not the case for

all host states.53 2
Applying standards prescribed by the agreement and
exempting or freezing the domestic law of the host state is more
complex. Many cross-border pipeline agreements between host
states and investors contain a uniform set of regulations in the
annexes of the agreements, but compliance with domestic
regulations is excluded.'
Freezing clauses are also common in
such agreements.5 34
For instance, environmental and safety
regulations were frozen for the entire forty-year period of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline agreement.'
Additionally,
according to the HGAs that were settled under the ECT, a wide
range of the technical codes and environmental standards are
described in the annex of relative agreements. 3
As shown
5 37
above, the operator in charge has a discretionary power to
implement such regulations, as occurred with the South Caucasus
Gas Pipeline and the BTC oil pipeline. 3 s Furthermore, in such
cases, the operator is usually largely exempted from compliance
with local environmental regulations by invoking the particular
contractual clause.5 39 As a result, the role of the host state in
protecting the public interest and, more particularly, environmental
interests is largely undermined.540
Although host states still have the right to monitor safety and
532 Christopher P.M. Waters, Who Should Regulate the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
Pipeline?, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 403, 407 (2004).
533 See e.g., Host Governmental Agreement Between and Among the Government of
Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323, app. 4.
534 Redgwell, supra note 163, at 106.
535 See Waters, supranote 532.
536 See e.g., Host Governmental Agreement Between and Among the Government of
Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323, app. 4
(explaining technical codes and environmental standards).
537 See Infra Sec. III.
538 See Host Governmental Agreement Between and Among the Government of
Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323, apps. 4, 5.
539 See generally Waters, supra note 532, at 403, 404 (arguing that the formulation
of agreements between host governments and oil companies allows the oil companies to
bypass adherance to local regulations).
540 See generally id. (arguing that the formulation of agreements between host
governments and oil companies allows the oil companies to bypass adherance to local
regulations).
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environmental regulations as regulated in the agreement and may
have the right to monitor the enforcement of the regulation with
which the operator should comply, the host state may be
confronted with a variety of difficulties in exercising this
monitoring task. In examining the effectiveness of this model,
three elements can be considered: substances and quality of these
standards, enforcement mechanisms, and public participation.
These standards are widely considered as stringent and
internationally compatible.54 1 For example, the BTC and SCP
pipelines' standards should be as stringent as EU standards.54 2
Hence, standards chosen by operators are of sufficiently high
quality to satisfy critics.54 3 Some view internationally compatible
and acceptable standards as well known regulations, but
developing countries as host states generally have less stringent oil
and gas pipeline regulations than developed countries. 5"
Furthermore, host state governments do not properly enforce
regulations.5 45 Thus, implementing international standards will
protect environmental interests better than local regulations. This
observation might be correct to the extent that it deals with the
quality of regulations, but there are some doubts concerning the
effectiveness of monitoring and enforcing the mentioned
Self-regulations, trade association codes, and
regulations.5 46
national standards are usually complemented by requiring public
monitoring, public enforcement, and other complementary
environmental enforcement mechanisms.5 47
First, as previously described, a wide range of regulations

Redgwell, supra note 163, at 109.
542 Due to the criticisms which arose in relation to unclear external references to
safety standards envisaged in the BTC pipeline agreement in 2003, the host states and the
BTC Company issued a Joint Statement to explain this ambiguity. They explicitly
mentioned that safety standards should not be less stringent than relevant standards
applicable to comparable projects in the Netherlands. They also added Austrian
standards as a basis for mountainous or earthquake-prone areas. Id.
543 See id.
544 See Waters, supra note 532, at 405.
545 See Eaton, supra note 123, at 282.
546 See Waters, supranote 532, at 405; Eaton, supra note 123, at 282.
547 For example, in the United States an abundant number of environmental and
safety regulations complement trade-association codes of conduct. See, e.g., The
Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90
(2012).
541
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might be provided in the agreement.5 48 Additionally, the reference
to the regulations described in the agreements might be ambiguous
and unclear.549 For example, the agreements may refer to
"international standards and practices within the petroleum
pipeline industry" or "international gas pipeline industry for
comparable projects." 5 o As a consequence, there can be
uncertainty concerning meaning and interpretation of such
phrases. 5 ' The operator is allowed to select its own standards.552
Accordingly, monitoring compliance with standards becomes very
difficult for the host states public authorities or other independent
watchdog organizations. 5 3 The enforcement of regulations is
mainly the responsibility of the operator.55 4 Hence, if the public
authorities sought to inspect the pipeline, they must give prior
notification5 5 and monitor compliance with the agreed standards
rather than their own domestic regulations.
Since these
environmental and safety regulations have not been established by
the public authorities of the host state, the host state may not be
familiar with the applicable standards."' Lacking information
regarding the contents and precise meaning of those standards can
make effective monitoring very difficult."
548 For instance, in the SCP HGA with Georgia, twenty-six technical standards were
prescribed and the possibility of using other western standards was reserved. See Host
Governmental Agreement Between and Among the Government of Georgia and State
Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supranote 323, app 4.
549 See id.
550 Id. This wording contains a wide range of standards. See Alexandra S. Wawryk,
InternationalEnvironmental Standards in the Oil Industry: Improving the Operations of
Transnational Oil Companies in Emerging Economies, 1.1 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.
INTELLIGENCE (2003) (discussing the meaning and dimension of international standards
and practices within petroleum industries).
551 See Wawryk, supra note 550.
552 See Infra Sec. 1, Subsec. b [the Unified Model].
553 See id.
554 See id.
555 See generally Host Governmental Agreement Between and Among the
Government of Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note
323 (noting several requirements for notifications before pipe inspections).
556 Natalie L. Bridgeman & David B. Hunter, Narrowing the Accountability Gap:
Toward a New Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 187, 195 (2008).
557 The lack of human, financial, and institutional resources in host states often leads
to ineffective monitoring and enforcement. Id. Additionally, the lack of technical
information of host states in relation to MNCs activities is highlighted in another study.
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In this case, an environmental and safety regulatory regime is
effectively established by the regulation created or selected by the
MNC. Authorities of the host state may have great difficulty in
obtaining adequate information on the applicable standards and
compliance.'
This problem might appear in the case of crossborder pipelines when the uniform regulatory regime has been
applied to a pipeline with limited accessible information for the
public authorities."'
Thus, if a MNC was exempted from compliance with the
environmental and safety regulations of a host state on the basis of
a contractual clause, some questions concerning the effectiveness
of such a regulatory regime can be asked. These internationally
compatible standards should be enforced properly and monitored
by the public authorities in charge. If public monitoring is not
possible, compliance with regulations by the MNC becomes
questionable. Moreover, the issue is not only one of inappropriate
enforcement. Often the MNC may de facto choose its own private
standards." It is well known that those private standards are not
always set in the public interest since the MNC is primarily
interested in profit maximizing."' Even if the MNC set high
quality safety standards without a guarantee of an appropriate
enforcement and monitoring, the effective control of
transboundary environmental pollution cannot be guaranteed.5 62
For the uniform set of regulations like in the SCP project, the
EIA, the risk assessment, and the emergency response plan shall
be prepared by independent consulting firms under contract by the

See M.A.

Six DECADES
UDHR AND BEYOND 527 (2010).
558 See generally X. Wu, Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals
with Asymmetric hIformation, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1 (2004).
(PINCITE?)
559 See, eg., Waters, supra note 532, at 415 (asserting that in the BTC pipeline, the
Environment Ministry of Georgia criticized BP's EIA, accusing BP of giving little
weight to risks endangering the Bajori protected area presented as a route of the pipeline
to the Environment Ministry).
560 See generally Baker supra note 521 (providing arguments in favor of applying
private codes of conduct by MNCs).
BADERIN & M. SSENYONJO, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:

AFTER THE

561 KEMA IROGBE, EFFECTS OF GOBALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICAN AFRICA AND ASIA:

A GLABL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE 15 (2014); see also E. Morgera, Corporate Accountability

in Inernational Environmental Law 5-9 (Oxford University Press, 2009).
562 See Hanakova, supranote 31.
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operator.563 The host state authorities can only approve the EIA
and other assessments that have been prepared in accordance with
the terms of the relevant agreement and not according to the
domestic regulations of the host state." A uniform EIA to the
entire length of a pipeline will help avoid tensions in integrating
distinct EIA reports for the same project in different countries.56 5
Nevertheless, local communities' concerns should not be
Since the local communities in affected states
underestimated.'
can participate in the EIA procedure as well, their participation can
guarantee that at least the environmental concerns of the affected
states are taken into account.56 7 Additionally, public participation
in EIA procedures should be accompanied by access to justice
through the courts or other relevant administrative bodies, as some
regulatory instruments such as the EU directive on EIA16 1
mandated. Otherwise, the comments presented by the public can
be ignored.
The importance of this issue is highlighted by drawing
attention to the terms of the Espoo Convention, which requires the
participation of all states concerned in the EIA procedure. 6 ' This
procedure, which is also compulsory for cross-border pipelines,
provides realistic insight into the necessity of concerned states'
participation. 7 o Accordingly, the respective states can scrutinize
the EIA report based on their own environmental regulations and
can ask for more information about adverse impacts of the
project.'
Meanwhile, if a respective state has no right to
563 See Host Government Agreement Between and Among The Government of
Georgia and State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, supra note 323, app. 4.
56 Id.
565 Hernindez, supra note 420, at 46.
566 See generally Bridgeman & Hunter, supra note 556 (suggesting a new
mechanism with the participation of local communities to narrow the gap of
accountability of MNCs).
567 See generally id. (suggesting a new mechanism with the participation of local
communities to narrow the gap of accountability of MNCs).
568 Directive 2011/92, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects
on the Environment, 2011 O.J. (L 26) art. I1.
569 Nord Stream Environmental Impact Assessment Documentation for Consultation
under the Espoo Convention, NORD STREAM 61-92 (Feb. 2009), https://www.nordstream.com/press-info/library/ (search document title and download).
570 Id.
571 Id. at 62.
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scrutinize and confirm the EIA and similar reports, the state may
not meet its environmental obligations properly.5 7 2
In addition, doubts exist about the reliability of EIAs that are
carried out by international firms due to repeat-player situations
with particular large MNCs."
In conclusion, when a uniform set of regulations is prioritized
over national regulations, applying a unified regulatory model
makes it difficult for host states to control the conduct of MNCs.57 4
Furthermore, when public authorities lack adequate information
about the adverse impacts of such projects and are not able to
monitor the application of such regulations appropriately, an
operator may maximize its own interests rather than public
interests.
In addition, many commentators doubt the accountability of
MNCs with regard to effective protection of the environment.5 76
In that case, a uniform regulatory regime without participation of
public authorities will increase possible contamination problems
and public health risks.
This article has noted potential flaws in
the regulatory model applicable to cross-border pipelines. The
current model strongly relies on industrial operators selecting a set
of different standards, which may equally include private
standards. This reliance raises important questions concerning the
ability of public authorities to adequately monitor compliance with
those standards. Whether this gives rise to ineffective safety
standards in practice is an issue, although beyond the scope of this
article.
However, it is striking that in an area such as cross-border
transport of oil and gas, which potentially can and does cause both
serious personal and environmental damage, there is a strong
reliance on operators' ability to choose their own optimal

See id.
573 See, e.g., PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE
LARGE DAMS 55 (Zed Books Limited, 2001).
574 See discussion supra [earlier within this section].
575 See id.
572
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576 E. MORGERA, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

LAw 25 (Oxford University Press, 2009); see e.g., Michael Anderson, Transnational
Corporationsand Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer, 41 WASHBURN L. J.
399 (2002).
577 See Infra Sec. 1, Subsec. b [the Unified Model].
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Since operators will primarily strive for profit
standards.
maximization, there are doubts that adequate internalization of
risks caused by transboundary pollution will take place in a model
where adequate public enforcement is lacking.
V. Concluding Remarks
Cross-border oil and gas pipelines play an important role in the
global energy trade."' Parties involved in such projects typically
seek to avoid political and economic turbulence in transporting oil
and gas via pipelines."' Parties involved try to prevent pipeline
accidents and, in the case of an accident, try to minimize incurred
harm by the most appropriate means.so In addition, parties
involved are not eager to publish the details of accidents when
they are not obliged to do so.5"' Meanwhile, according to
published data, cross-border pipelines have led to a lower number
of accidents compared to cross-country pipelines. 582 Nevertheless,
accidents are still widespread, imposing personal injuries on
victims, environmental damage, and economic losses.8
It is striking that there is no international convention
specifically dealing with safety standards for cross-border
pipelines or compensation of harm that results from cross-border
pipeline accidents. The international community has instead
incorporated regulations into multilateral and bilateral agreements
by formulating a few model agreements.5 84 As the current
international framework stands, regulations on the safety of crossborder pipelines consists of private agreements between various
operators and governments, which provides the parties involved
the discretionary power to apply particular safety and
environmental standards. 8 5
The law and economics theory adopted in this contribution
holds that operators will maximize their own utility and, as
industrial operators, their own profits. In the absence of legal
578 See Infra Sec. I.

579 See id.
580 See id.
581 See id.

582 See Papadikis,supra note 3.
583 See id; see also Muhlbauer, supranote 7.
584 See Infra Subsec. b. [Model Agreements for Cross-Border Pipelines].
585 See id.
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rules, environmental costs may be externalized.5 86 Currently,
existing conventions, such as UNCLOS187 and the Espoo
Convention," do not sufficiently guarantee externalization of
transboundary pollution via cross-border pipelines. The creation
of a more appropriate international legal framework with clear and
harmonized safety and environmental standards is needed. This
legal framework should allow public authorities to effectively
enforce compliance, thus preventing the externalization of
pollution costs to local communities across borders.

586 See id.
587

UNCLOS, supra note 198.

588

See Espoo, supra note 200.

